Conceptual Foundations for Environmental Ethics: A Daoist Perspective more

Fall 2003 247 Conceptual Foundations for Environmental Ethics: A Daoist Perspective Karyn L. Lai* The concepts dao and de in the Daodejing may be evoked to support a distinctive and plausible account of environmental holism. Dao refers to the totality of particulars, including the relations that hold between them, and the respective roles and functions of each within the whole. De refers to the distinctiveness of each particular, realized meaningfully only within the context of its interdependence with others, and its situatedness within the whole. Together, dao and de provide support for an ethical holism that avoids sacrificing individuals for the sake of the whole. The integrity and stability of the whole are important not because the whole is an end-in-itself but because those conditions assist in preserving the well-being of the constituent parts. In other words, the ethical holism supported in the Daodejing does not present individuals and wholes in mutually exclusive terms, but sees them in symbiotic relation, allowing for events to be mutually beneficial, or mutually obstructive, to both. In addition, two other Daoist concepts, wuwei (non-action) and ziran (spontaneity), provide further support for this construction of holism. If the distinctiveness of particular individuals is valued, then unilateral or reductive norms which obliterate such individuality are inappropriate. In this regard, the methodology of wuwei allows for the idea of individuals developing spontaneously in relation to others. According to this view of holism, individuals manifest and realize their integrity in relation to others in the environmental context, achieving an outcome that is maximally co-possible within those limits, rather than one that is maximally beneficial only for particular individuals. I. INTRODUCTION The Daoist classic, the Daodejing, has often been cited for its complex, metaphysical insights regarding the nature of reality and the theory of relations between individual things and beings. There is a growing body of literature on the application of Daoist thought to contemporary debates about the environment.1 The literature ranges from basic proposals, such as a reexamination of * School of Philosophy, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia. Lai’s key research interests are in comparative philosophy, with particular focus on applying ideas from Chinese philosophies to issues in contemporary philosophy and ethics. She is currently working on a book addressing issues in feminist philosophy, moral and political philosophy and environmental philosophy, drawing on insights from Confucian and Daoist philosophies, to be published by Ashgate Publishing. Lai has authored a number of articles, including a commissioned chapter on attitudes to the natural world in classical Chinese philosophy, in Dale Jamieson, ed., Companion to Environmental Ethics (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2001). 1 Prominent collections include Environmental Ethics 8, no. 3 (Winter 1986); Philosophy East and West 37, no. 2 (April 1987); and J. Baird Callicott and Roger T. Ames, eds., Nature in Asian 247 248 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS Vol. 25 the human relationship to nature,2 to more complex arguments which utilize certain Daoist ideas in order to provoke a reassessment of assumptions and categories in contemporary thought.3 Some include suggestions that the aesthetic order which underlies Daoist thought provides important conceptual frameworks for environmental philosophy.4 Such explorations into the relevance and effectiveness of Daoist philosophy as applied to contemporary environmental problems should be taken seriously, albeit with care. For instance, there are chapters in the Daodejing that appear to advocate primordial simplicity (19, 25, 32, 37, 62, 80),5 which some thinkers have sought to appropriate in the service of their own naturalistic outlooks: In the Far east the man-nature relationship was marked by respect, bordering on love, absent in the West. . . . Chinese Taoists postulated an infinite and benign force in the natural world. . . . Taoism fostered love of wilderness rather than hatred.6 The first clear expression of ecological thinking appears in ancient China from about the sixth century B.C. . . . The Taoists resented [the] meddling [of the Confucianists] and believed all could live in spontaneous harmony with nature. They offered the most profound and eloquent philosophy of nature ever elaborated and the first stirrings of an ecological sensibility.7 These assertions need to be carefully investigated, however. One needs to ask whether the dictum to “live in spontaneous harmony with nature” provides sufficient justification, conceptual resources and motivational force for an effective environmental ethic. In this essay, I attempt to avoid simplistic applications of Daoist philosophy and aim to demonstrate that it provides critical conceptual tools for addressing Traditions of Thought: Essays in Environmental Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989). 2 Po-Keung Ip, “Taoism and the Foundations of Environmental Ethics,” Environmental Ethics 5 (1983): 335–43. 3 See, for example, Chung-ying Cheng’s “On the Environmental Ethics of the Tao and the Ch’i,” Environmental Ethics 8 (1986): 351–70. 4 See Roger Ames, “Taoism and the Nature of Nature,” Environmental Ethics 8 (1986): 317– 50; R. P. Peerenboom, “Beyond Naturalism: A Reconstruction of Daoist Environmental Ethics” in Environmental Ethics 13 (1991): 3–22; Chung-yuan Chang, Creativity and Taoism: A Study of Chinese Philosophy, Art, and Poetry (New York: Julian Press, 1963); Chung-yuan Chang, Tao: A New Way of Thinking (New York: Harper and Row, 1975); and Kirill Thompson, “Taoist Cultural Reality: The Harmony of Aesthetic Order,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 17 (1990): 175–86. 5 The numbers here refer to chapter numbers in the Daodejing; this system of referencing (bracketed numbers) will be used throughout this essay unless otherwise indicated. 6 Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 192–93. 7 Peter Marshall, Nature’s Web: Rethinking Our Place on Earth (New York: Paragon House, 1992), p. 9. Fall 2003 CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 249 certain debates in environmental philosophy. I argue that, both in its key concepts and in its anti-anthropocentric tenor, the Daodejing provides a justification for an environmental ethic that reaches beyond humans, individuals, or species. This project draws upon both the metaphysical and ethical resources that are available in the Daodejing to justify an environmental ethic which espouses a holistic perspective but which nevertheless recognizes the integrity of individuals. The second section of the essay explores the Daoist concept, de, both in secondary commentaries and in the Daodejing itself. The third section investigates two sets of related concepts in the Daodejing. The first is the concepts dao and de, focusing primarily on their interdependence, and the second is the notions of wuwei and ziran. I argue, with reference to these four concepts, that the Daoist notion of interdependence may be invoked to support a pluralistic account of value in the context of holism. The final section reviews various significant themes such as anthropocentricism, human-nature dualism, and holism, in the light of Daoist philosophy. I also establish that Daoist philosophy provides important philosophical and ethical resources for dealing with contemporary environmental issues. II. INTERPRETATIONS OF DE De, often translated as “virtue,” is one of two cardinal concepts in the Daodejing, the treatise on dao and de.8 However, some scholars have noted with concern that analyses of Daoist philosophy have too frequently failed to accord the concept de the significance it is due.9 There is a range of possible meanings of the concept de deriving from its usage in the chapters of the Daodejing. The term is commonly translated to mean moral principle or virtue in the conventional sense, indicating one’s moral cultivation. This approach has been taken in various ways by Chinese scholars such as Lionel Giles,10 Wing-tsit Chan,11 and D. C. Lau.12 08 The terms dao and de (Pinyin transliteration system) correspond to tao and te (Wade-Giles system commonly used in earlier literature) respectively. The Pinyin system is used in this essay because it is more up-to-date and widely used. 09 With the oldest existing versions of the Daodejing excavated from the Han tombs at Mawangdui in China in 1973, the bamboo strips on which the texts are inscribed are arranged in such a way that the final forty-four chapters of the received text, the De Jing, are placed first. Hence, a translator of the Mawangdui Daodejing has labelled his translation the “Dedaojing.” See Robert Henricks, Lao-tze Te-tao Ching: A New Translation Based on the Recently Discovered Ma-Wang-Tui Texts (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989). See also Ames, “Taoism and the Nature of Nature,” esp. sec. 4: “Taoism Misnamed.” 10 Lionel Giles, The Sayings of Lao Tzu (London: John Murray. 1907). 11 Wing-tsit Chan, The Way of Lao Tzu (New York: Library of Liberal Arts, Bobbs-Merrill, 1963). Chan writes, “[t]he main objective of [the Daodejing] is the cultivation of virtue or te” (pp. 10–11). 12 D. C. Lau, Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963). Although Lau contemplates a richer interpretation of de, he proceeds very quickly to dismiss the significance of that 250 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS Vol. 25 However, the interpretation of de to denote moral goodness is unsatisfactory because it overlooks the vagueness of the text regarding questions of ethics or axiology. Additionally, the interpretation of de as “virtue” or “moral principle” neglects the Daoist criticism of existing norms and values. The Daodejing is incisive in its criticism of contemporary values and virtues in the ancient Chinese context.13 This criticism was, at its most fundamental level, a universal rejection of the all-too-human activity of promoting values which are superficial and unnecessarily dichotomous, divisive and hence, which tend to mislead: When the people of the world all know beauty as beauty, There arises the recognition of ugliness. When they all know the good as good, There arises the recognition of evil. . . . (2) The five colors cause one’s eyes to be blind. The five tones cause one’s ears to be deaf. The five flavors cause one’s palate to be spoiled. . . . (12)14 Against this background of scepticism regarding conventional values, the interpretation of de to denote a conventional sense of moral goodness would sit uneasily with Daoist philosophy. The problem with this interpretation is compounded by the fact that there is another term in the Daodejing, shan, which does refer to moral goodness, and which at times occurs in the same passage with de. 15 It needs to be noted, however, that Wing-tsit Chan’s and Lau’s analyses of de are not confined to human ethical action. Both scholars recognize multiple interpretations of de. Chan argues that dao is the ontological source from which all things derive their existence, and de refers to the particular instantiation (the essence, so to speak), of each existing thing: . . . te is Tao endowed in the individual things. While Tao is common to all, it is what each thing has obtained from Tao, or its te, that makes it different from others. Te is then the individualizing factor, the embodiment of definite principles which give things their determinate features or characters.16 interpretation, together with the role of de within the Daodejing. He writes: “In its Taoist usage, te refers to the virtue of a thing (which is what it ‘gets’ from the tao). In other words, te is the nature of a thing, because it is in virtue of its te that a thing is what it is. But in the Lao tzu the term is not a particularly important one and is often used in its more conventional senses” (p. 42). 13 See Daodejing 5, 18, 19, 20, 38. 14 Chan’s translation from The Way of Lao Tzu. This translation is used throughout this essay, unless otherwise specified. 15 See Daodejing 8, 27, 30, 49, 54, 61 and 81. 16 Chan, The Way of Lao Tzu. Chan’s interpretation of de is based partly on a traditional definition of the term which draws from its homophone, de (to obtain). See Chan’s comments on p. 11. Fall 2003 CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 251 According to Chan’s analysis, de may be understood within an overarching framework, dao, within which individual beings manifest their distinctiveness. In this way, an emphasis on de is an emphasis on the particularity or distinctiveness of individual beings. Additionally, the theme of relationality is also important: each thing embodies its particular de within the contextual environment of dao. Similarly, Lau’s analysis highlights the connection between de and dao, explicitly drawing out the interdependent nature of all existence. On his definition, de refers to the integrity of being a particular thing, rather than to its ability or willingness to conform to predetermined standards. The ontology is particularly interesting because all things are seen to embody their distinctive natures in and through their common origin, dao. It is unfortunate, though, that Lau’s analysis stops short of fleshing out this ontology.17 Chan’s and Lau’s claim that de signifies individuality within the context of the whole is articulated in the Daodejing: When When When When one one one one cultivates cultivates cultivates cultivates [de] [de] [de] [de] in in in in his person, it becomes genuine [de] his family, it becomes overflowing [de] his community, it becomes lasting [de] the world, it becomes universal. . . . (54) Here, there is a strong suggestion that the respective function of each individual thing is context-specific rather than normative, and also that de generates different ends in each of these contexts. Other Daoist scholars such as J. L. Duyvendak,18 Arthur Waley, 19 and Max Kaltenmark20 provide interpretations of de which are multidimensional. Duyvendak contends that the archaic sense of the term is actually a morally neutral one, signifying some kind of magic power rather than moral goodness: “good conduct,” in a naturalistic sense and spontaneous manner, is the older sense of the term; “good conduct” in a human and ethical sense only came into use later, due partly to Confucian influence. In a similar tone, Waley contends that the term power is a more appropriate translation of de because the earlier usage of de allows for de to be understood as bad as well as good, not unlike the Indian karma in the following respects: Te is anything that happens to one or that one does of a kind indicating that, as a consequence, one is going to meet with good or bad luck. It means, so to speak, Lau, Lao Tzu, p. 42. L. Duyvendak, Tao Te Ching: The Book of the Way and Its Virtue (London: John Murray, 1954). 19 Arthur Waley, The Way and Its Power: A Study of the Tao Te Ching and Its Place in Chinese Thought (New York: Grove Press, 1958). 20 Max Kaltenmark, Lao Tzu and Taoism, trans. Roger Greaves (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969). 18 J. 17 252 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS Vol. 25 the stock of credit (or the deficit) that at any given moment a man has at the bank of fortune.21 Kaltenmark offers a compelling analysis of de. His study is particularly insightful because it is multifaceted and accommodates different conceptions of de. Quoting Marcel Granet’s study of Chinese thought, Kaltenmark states that de is “the ideal efficacy that becomes particular as it becomes real.”22 He also notes that de is generally used with positive connotations, though his analysis strives to retain the original sense of potency, which may be good or bad. He suggests that . . . [te] always implies a notion of efficacy and specificity. Every creature possessing a power of any kind, natural or acquired, is said to have Te. . . . [Te] has varied meanings ranging from magical potency to moral virtue. But the latter is a derived meaning, for originally Te was not necessarily good. . . . Nevertheless, Te is generally used in the good sense: it is an inner potency that favorably influences those close to its possessor, a virtue that is beneficent and life-giving.23 Kaltenmark’s articulation of the concept de has the advantage of recognizing and allowing for a range of understandings of the concept that are necessitated by the cryptic and piecemeal nature of the text. Based on the discussion of de in this section, two important features of de may be detected: (a) there is a strong suggestion of an intrinsic relatedness between individuals within the framework of the dao. Relations are intrinsic rather than extrinsic in that individuals are determined in part by their respective places in the dao. Here, the remarks of Chung-ying Cheng, who contrasts a superficial notion of the term environment with its deeper (Daoist) sense, are pertinent: [According to a superficial sense of the term, environment means] simply “the surroundings,” the physical periphery, the material conditions and the transient circumstances. . . . [However, environment] cannot be treated as an object, the material conditions, a machine tool, or a transient feature. Environment is more than the visible, more than the tangible, more than the external, more than a matter of quantified period or time or spread of space. It has a deep structure as well as a deep process, as the concept of Tao indicates.24 21 Waley, The Way and Its Power, p. 31. Waley’s view of de is predicated on correlative thought. The theme of correlative thinking assumes an intrinsic relatedness between all things and beings, covering a wide sweep of all existence including cosmic forces, all species and natural objects, and even aspects of human life such as government. Chinese scholar A. C. Graham provides a comprehensive account of correlative thinking in “Yin-Yang and the Nature of Correlative Thinking,” Singapore: Institute of East Asian Philosophies, Occasional Paper and Monograph Series, no. 6, 1986. 22 Marcel Granet, La Pensee Chinoise (Paris, 1934), p. 303; cited in Kaltenmark, Lao Tzu and Taoism, p. 27. 23 Kaltenmark, Lao Tzu and Taoism pp. 27–28. 24 Cheng, “On the Environmental Ethics of the Tao and the Ch’i,” p. 353. Fall 2003 CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 253 A corollary to the theme of intrinsic relatedness is that of interdependence of individuals. The interdependent relation between the self and others within the context of the whole engenders a relational and contextual concept of the self. Within such a structure, individuals can only achieve full realization in the context of their interdependence with others. (b) Associated with the deeper notion of environment articulated in (a), de seems to provide the specifications for an individual’s integrity in the context of its relations with other individuals. Within an environment where interdependence is emphasized, the integrity of individuals is important as it is necessary to prevent the obliteration of individual distinctiveness, interests and needs, which might too easily be subsumed under the rubric of the whole. These two features—interdependence and integrity—are held in a finely tuned balance. The individual seeks and attains meaning within contextual and relational boundaries and affiliations. However, if these are overly restrictive, the integrity of the individual will be diminished or eradicated. Hence, de is important in setting the extent of self-determination. De refers to (a development or cultivation of) the distinctive characteristics of individuals. Yet, the sense of integrity is far removed from any suggestion of independent, separate existence. In the view of the Daodejing, severe fragmentation of the different forms of life is brought about partly by the imposition of a rigid axiological framework upon all aspects of existence; this cuts up the uncarved block, so to speak (see Daodejing 28). III. INTERDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY: DAO AND DE ALLOWING FOR SPONTANEITY: WUWEI AND ZIRAN The paradigmatic dao of Heaven is inclusive (73), standing in contrast to the tendencies of the human world to create inequalities (77). The method of dao is to treat all equally: “. . . Heaven and earth unite to drip sweet dew. Without the command of men, it drips evenly over all” (32). Additionally, the interdependence of things within the whole is implicit in the idea that all draw benefit from dao (34, 81). This theme of dao benefiting all things is effectively epitomized by the action of water: The best [man] 25 is like water, Water is good; it benefits [li] all things and does not compete with them. It dwells in (lowly) places that all disdain. This is why it is so near to Tao (8) From an ontological point of view, the concept dao signifies the shared 25 Chan (The Way of Lao Tzu) adds the word man at this point in the statement. Chan states that some interpreters have taken the phrase to mean the best man, while others take it to mean the “highest good.” In Chan’s view, both interpretations are possible (see pp. 113–14). However, I prefer to ellipt the word because the addition narrows the applicability of these ideas to humankind. 254 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS Vol. 25 context within which all things exist. In the case of the natural environment, this assertion is, at one level, undeniably true: all species and beings that live within the natural environment are ontologically connected; beings encroach on others, they contribute to and extract from their natural environments and, most importantly, they share the same biosphere. However, an understanding of dao from a purely ontological point of view can be limiting. At points in the Daodejing, the concept is referred to not as an ontological reality but as a metaphysical ideal. In this latter sense, dao is an abstraction, not an actual existence. In other words, it also functions as a conceptual tool or a psychological device to assist in the visualization of an ideal state of affairs whereby particulars come together in fulfilment of their particular de, in a way that is maximally possible within an environment that includes multiple others. This vision draws from an integration of the concepts dao and de. The metaphors that the Daodejing is renowned for also illustrate the inclusivity of dao. Collectively, the images of the infant, water, rivers and seas, the female, and the valley exemplify the qualities of softness [rou],26 weakness [ruo],27 quietude [jing], 28 and non-assertiveness [buzhen].29 It may appear that these characteristics make a virtue of submissiveness in order to facilitate a realization of a harmonious whole. On such a view, the integrated whole is achieved at a cost to some individuals: they are required to be non-assertive, still or weak. On this interpretation, Daoism would collapse into a trivial and implausible holism, one that calls for the unconditional denial of the integrity of individuals. However, it is clear that some key passages in the Daodejing challenge such a trivial holism: Tao produces them. Te fosters them. . . . They always come spontaneously. . . . (Tao) produces them but does not take possession of them. . . . It leads them but does not master them. This is called profound and secret te. (51)30 There are two key phrases here which recognize the importance of integrity. That “tao produces them but does not take possession of them” (sheng er buyou) could be translated to mean “to produce or to assist in (their) growth but not to possess (them).” Similarly, that dao “leads them but does not master them” (chang er buzai) expresses the view of leading without dominating. Within the context of the passage, there is a strong suggestion that the holistic 26 Daodejing 27 Ibid., 10, 36, 43, 76, 78. 36, 52, 55, 76, 78. 28 Ibid., 15, 16, 26, 37, 39, 45, 57, 64. 29 Ibid., 8, 22, 66, 68, 73, 81. 30 The sentiments in this passage are echoed in Daodejing 2 and 10. Fall 2003 CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 255 perspective does not entail the negation of individual or distinctive features or concerns. Furthermore, it is striking that dao and de are mentioned together, highlighting the themes of interdependence and integrity. De is that distinctiveness, integrity, or excellence of each individual thing that can be realized only in the context of the whole, the ideal dao. A Chinese scholar, Roger Ames, expresses a similar view of the dao-de polarity: . . . [te] denotes the arising of the particular in a process vision of existence. The particular is the unfolding of a sui generis focus of potency that embraces and determines conditions within the range and parameters of its particularity. . . . Just as any one ingredient in the stewpot must be blended with all of the others in order to express most fully its own flavor, so harmonization with other environing particulars is a necessary precondition for the fullest self-disclosure of any given particular. 31 Ames’ conceptualization of dao and de is not unlike the account expressed in this paper in that it stresses the maintenance of integrity of individual beings while simultaneously emphasizing the importance of context and environment. Ames also makes the important point that the individual-environment nexus should not be seen as dichotomous. In other words, while the individual may be restricted by various aspects of its environment and by its relations with others, this restriction is not necessarily a negative condition.32 The maintenance of the integrity of each individual entity is also espoused in two integral Daoist concepts, non-action (wuwei) and spontaneity (ziran): He who takes action fails. He who grasps things loses them. For this reason the sage takes no action (wuwei) and therefore does not fail. He grasps nothing and therefore he does not lose anything. . . . He learns to be unlearned, and returns to what the multitude has missed (Tao). Thus he supports all things in their natural state (ziran) but does not take any action. (64) Scholars have often puzzled over of both these concepts, notorious for their ambiguity. The first, wuwei, is most frequently though somewhat misleadingly translated as “non-action.” This translation evokes a sense of passivity and Ames, “Taoism and the Nature of Nature,” p. 331. takes issue with the fact that reasoning in Chinese philosophy is not reducible to, or cannot be subsumed under existing categories in Western philosophies. However, where the ideas in this paper might differ from Ames’ is in the latter’s suggestion that an aesthetic rather than logical order is fundamental in Chinese thought (as contrasted with Western science) in ibid, pp. 320–26. While the distinction between aesthetic and logical order is meaningful and useful, Ames’ assertion that the aesthetic order is the ground of Chinese cosmology may neglect or omit other integrated modes of operation such as the moral or the rational (or reasonable). 32 Ames 31 256 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS Vol. 25 inaction, rendering any suggestions for activity or change incoherent. Some scholars have argued that the interpretation of wuwei as “non-intrusive action” or “non-interfering action” is more philosophically profound and interesting.33 These latter translations support a meaningful rendition of the concept wuwei both at the sociopolitical level (arguing against the imposition of artificial, conformist and universally binding norms) and at the metaphysical level (acknowledging the inappropriateness and fatality of imposing egocentric or anthropocentric norms upon other individuals or species).34 The term ziran has often been translated as “nature” or “natural.” It functions both as a noun, corresponding with the notion of the natural environment, or as an adjective which means “spontaneous.” Chapter twenty-five illuminates this concept: There was something undifferentiated and yet complete, Which existed before heaven and earth. . . . I do not know its name; I call it Tao. . . . Tao models itself after Nature (ziran). It needs to be noted that the commonly used translation of ziran as “nature” is misleading, locating in the concept ziran an inherent concern for the natural environment. However, the unquestioning ease with which Daoist thought has been adopted to address certain issues in environmental philosophy has recently been brought under scrutiny by scholars such as Ramachandra Guha: The detection of a “love of wilderness” and of the “first stirrings of an ecological sensibility” in Daoist thought reflect a selective reading of the Daoist texts as well as conjecture regarding the intention and attitudes of the early Daoists toward environmental concerns. . . . such utopic renditions of Daoist thought need further to be justified in the face of ecological disasters in Chinese history. 35 The interpretation of the message of the Daodejing as supporting naturalistic primitivism also leads to triviality. Either human beings belong to the realm of the natural—in which case the dictum to be natural, like dao, is superfluous— or they do not—in which case the dictum to be natural is a misdirected aim.36 The alternative translation of ziran as a principle or as a modus operandi is 33 See the comprehensive discussions of wuwei by Benjamin Schwartz, “The Ways of Taoism,” in The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), and Angus C. Graham, “Heaven and Man Go Their Own Ways” in Disputers of the Tao (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing, 1989). 34 See Daodejing 5, discussed later in this section. 35 “Radical American Environmentalism and Wilderness Preservation: A Third World Critique,” in Andrew Brennan, ed., The Ethics of the Environment (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth, 1995), pp. 239–52. 36 Peerenboom, “Beyond Naturalism.” Fall 2003 CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 257 both more plausible and fruitful.37 On this interpretation, wuwei and ziran, understood in combination, provide a coherent picture of Daoist non-assertiveness: allowing for the spontaneity of any one individual requires the other, or others, not to impose unnecessary constraints on this individual.38 In other words, wuwei expresses the methodology of dao which, in respecting the integrity of individuals, allows room for their spontaneous development. Cheng alludes to this latter interpretation of ziran in his views on environmental ethics inspired by Daoist philosophy: . . . tzu-jan (ziran) is not something beyond and above the Tao. It is the movement of the Tao as the Tao, namely as the underlying unity of all things as well as the underlying source of the life of all things. One important aspect of tzu-jan is that the movement of things must come from the internal life of things and never results from engineering or conditioning by an external power. 39 Cheng identifies ziran not merely in ontological terms, but also as a process, a “movement.” His analysis also links ziran with the notions of de (the “internal life of things”) with wuwei (not being conditioned by an external power). In the application of wuwei and ziran to environmental thought, it may be argued that those who share in the Daoist insight will refrain from imposing a human-centered perspective on all things and will not expect the myriad creatures (wanwu) to conform to human norms.40 Kirill Thompson, who argues for an aesthetic organization inherent in Daoist philosophy, suggests that . . . in a Taoist world characterized by aesthetic order, each particular from flea to red giant emerges as a center of things, a bona fide point of reference. . . . Significantly, none is intrinsically better than any other; our preferences among them simply reflect our own perspectives and cannot be given any ultimate justification. 41 The organizational picture presented by Thomson is supported by Daodejing 5, which opens with Heaven and Earth are not humane (ren), They regard all things as straw dogs. 37 This understanding of ziran as spontaneity, when applied to the final sentence in chapter sixty-four, would read, “[the Daoist sage] supports all things in their spontaneous development by not taking any action that interferes with their spontaneity.” The translation of ziran as “spontaneity” instead of “nature” in chaps. 23, 51, and 54 is also particularly effective. 38 See Daodejing 12, 18, 19, 20, 37 and 53. 39 Cheng, “On the Environmental Ethics of the Tao and the Ch’i,” p. 356. 40 Daodejing 4, 5, 25, and 64. 41 Thompson, “Taoist Cultural Reality: The Harmony of Aesthetic Order,” p. 177. 258 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS Vol. 25 The sage is not humane. He regards all people as straw dogs. D. C. Lau, a scholar of Chinese thought notes in his translation that “[i]n the T’ien yun chapter in the Chuang tzu it is said that straw dogs were treated with the greatest deference before they were used as an offering, only to be discarded and trampled upon as soon as they had served their purpose.” 42 Apart from its anti-anthropocentric tone, the notion of straw dogs is philosophically interesting, its significance reaching beyond issues of instrumentality. While the straw dog serves a certain function within the sacrifice, it is also central to it; without the straw dog, the sacrifice loses its fuller, broader and richer significance, and perhaps cannot proceed at all. In this way, the issue of the straw dogs—a symbol for “all things” (wanwu)—transcends debates on intrinsic and instrumental value. The tone of Daodejing 5 impels us to see everything as holding its distinctive significance within the context of the dao. From this analysis, the two sets of concepts, dao and de, and wuwei and ziran, are seen in their fullest cooperation: the recognition and valuing of individual distinctiveness (de) entails an appreciation of its spontaneous expression (ziran); allowing for (wuwei) spontaneity, on the other hand, is not simply idiosyncratic and uncoordinated self-fulfilment. The realization of each individual is meaningful only within the context of its relatedness and responsivity to others within the whole (dao). The affirmation of the value of individual beings within the environmental context feeds into a complex holism which emphasizes both the integrity and interdependence of individuals. IV. A DAOIST PROPOSAL FOR AN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC ANTI-ANTHROPOCENTRICISM A major theme that cuts across many debates in environmental philosophy is that of anthropocentricism. At its most general level, anthropocentricism, construed as the inability or unwillingness of human beings to accord moral standing or moral consideration to other species, has been held responsible for the degraded state of the natural environment and for the extinction of species. The issue of anthropocentricism has been at the centre of debates about the nature and scope of environmental ethics. A number of environmental ethicists see anthropocentricism as the basic problem in environmental ethics. They argue that to construct an environmental ethic based on human concerns is to beg the question about the need for environmental ethics to address the issue of human-centeredness in environmental thought. For instance, Val Plumwood, articulating an ecofeminist philosophy, argues against integrating “nature” into an essentially anthropocentric model. Plumwood 42 Lau, Lao Tzu, p. 61. Fall 2003 CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 259 sets up five features that a viable, non-hierarchical and non-anthropocentric environmental ethic should include. These are (a) the acknowledgment of dependency between human beings and other beings (the well-being of other species is not merely accidentally or externally related to that of human beings and vice versa); the avoidance of radical exclusion of human beings from other beings (radical exclusion denies the possibility of continuity and community between the human and the nonhuman; a proper resolution requires not just a recognition of similarities and differences but also a recognition of a complex, interacting pattern both of continuity and difference); the avoidance of merely incorporating other beings within the notion of humanity (Plumwood calls this an “assimilating” strategy which may result in other species being seen as inferior humans); the avoidance of instrumentalism at all costs (a viable environmental ethic should consider other beings and species, and the natural environment, not merely as means to human ends); and the avoidance of homogenization or stereotyping (involving a recognition that the beings within the natural environment are not homogenous; other species have some different needs from those of human beings and different individuals and species have their distinctive characteristics and interests). 43 (b) (c) (d) (e) The view in the Daodejing described in this essay incorporates the points articulated by Plumwood. In response to Plumwood’s concerns, the philosophy of the Daodejing as outlined in this essay may be presented as follows: (a 1) The perspective of the dao presents an ideal inclusive whole that does not permit the mere assertion of human priority. The flourishing of dao is predicated upon the well-being of individuals within the dao. Hence, the assertion of independence on the part of human beings, or any other being or species, will be ultimately futile because it severs essential interdependencies between beings. (b1) The Daoist criticism of the Confucian project of creating a human cultural identity, distinct and separate from all other species and the natural environment, addresses this concern of radical exclusion. Daoism deems human institutions, ranks and hierarchies as “unnatural” because they remove continuities and similarities between humans and their natural environment. (c 1) Daoist axiology is irreducible to one group, kind or species, or even 43 Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (London: Routledge Publishing. 1993), pp. 48–55. 260 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS Vol. 25 to the whole. Daoist thought strongly urges a transcendence of the merely human. It is also sceptical regarding the values that are upheld by humankind, and imposed on all aspects of human and nonhuman existence. In particular, the concepts wuwei and ziran support a conceptual system that recognizes the integrity of each individual and allows for their spontaneous development, within the parameters of its environment. (d1 ) The rejection of conventional values involves an overturning of dualism through a shattering of dualistic pairs, embodied in the daode polarity. This rejection of dualism entails a rejection of the unconditional valuing of all that is human as deserving absolute priority. Additionally, it is not the case that only human beings possess noninstrumental value. The theme of intrinsic relatedness of beings and species is one that casts doubt on the whole debate regarding which beings have intrinsic value and which others have only instrumental value. First, it blurs the clear individuation and separation of particulars. Second, it endorses a multitiered value system where relationships, in addition to individuals, are valued. (e1) The Daodejing recognizes the integrity of individuals within the whole and seeks to promote their well-being within the context of the whole. The valuing of individuals also prompts a recognition of a multiplicity of needs, interests and values. The depth of the philosophy of the Daodejing lies not merely in the fact that it is able to respond to the requirements of a non-anthropocentric environmental ethic as proposed by Plumwood. It could also provide a more thorough evaluation of the issue of anthropocentricism itself, which has been intensely debated. Some philosophers reject the methodology of merely extending existing normative ethical theories to include nonhuman species, individuals and entities in our moral consideration.44 Others argue against anthropocentricism inherent in existing normative theories, contending that the only viable environmental ethic is one with a non-anthropocentric, ecological focus.45 In response, there are arguments against the viability or plausibility of a nonanthropocentric ethical system, instigating some to make a distinction between weak anthropocentricism and strong anthropocentricism.46 While anthropo44 See, for example, John Rodman, “Review Discussions: The Liberation of Nature?” Inquiry 20 (1977): 83–145; Richard and Val Routley, “Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics,” in Don Mannison, Michael McRobbie, and Richard Routley, eds., Environmental Philosophy (Canberra: Australian National University, Research School of the Social Sciences, 1980), pp. 96–99. 45 See, for example, Arne Naess, “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecological Movement,” Inquiry 16 (1973): 95–100, and Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature. 46 Defenders of weak anthropocentricism include Eugene Hargrove, “Weak Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value,” in Max Oelschlaeger, ed., After Earth Day: Continuing the Conservation Effort Fall 2003 CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 261 centric environmental ethics may fall anywhere within this range—and, indeed, the credibility of the distinction has been questioned—the key difference between weak and strong anthropocentricism is not that the latter lacks any tangible concern for the natural environment. Rather, strong anthropocentrists in general perceive the appreciation of value, and the act of valuing, as essentially human enterprises. In that connection, they normally move on to posit that the concerns of nonhumans or the natural environment are only instrumental or secondary to human concerns and hence are only worth pursuing or preserving within that framework. In contrast, the range of weak anthropocentric theories uphold that at least some nonhuman interests are morally considerable, although they may be overridden by human ones. Here, again, the distinctness of such positions from non-anthropocentric views has been challenged. 47 The Daodejing circumvents debates about whether environmental ethics should seek to be anthropocentric or non-anthropocentric. It bypasses debates on whether individuals, entities, or species possess intrinsic or instrumental value, proposing instead to understand value in terms of the individual’s place within the whole. The value of the straw dog within the context of the whole is neither only instrumental nor only intrinsic. When applied to environmental issues, the analogy is clear: individuals, species, or entities are situated in, and connected to others within, the natural environment. In this context, they seldom, if ever, possess only intrinsic value or only instrumental value. It is perhaps through this method of moving beyond both debates on anthropocentrism, and intrinsic versus instrumental value, that environmental ethics can begin properly to consider the ethical development of human attitudes and behavior within the natural environment. A GAINST HUMAN SEPARATENESS AND O THER D UALISMS It has been asserted that anthropocentric attitudes are based partly in a commitment to the view that humans are separate and independent of other species and the environment. Such a perspective is, in turn, often linked to a dualistic framework set up between humans and other species, such as that between man-nature, subject-object, master-slave or dominant-dominated. This fundamental dualism is problematic as it is associated with the viewing of humans as discontinuous with, independent of, superior to, and perhaps even antithetical to, the natural environment. Such a perspective is damaging not only for the natural environment but for humans as well. It legitimizes a false (Denton, Tex.: University of North Texas Press, 1992). Those who propose versions of strong anthropocentricism include William Baxter, People or Penguins: The Case for Optimal Pollution (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974). See also Bryan Norton, “Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentricism,” Environmental Ethics 6 (1984): 131–48. 47 See Norton, “Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentricism.” 262 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS Vol. 25 dichotomy between humans and the environment, and it warrants, specifically, the mastery, domination and exploitation of the natural environment by human beings.48 Additionally, such assumptions of the human-nature dichotomy tend to oversimplify aspects of connectedness between humans, other species, and the environment, and thus restrict a full and proper evaluation of ethical issues, often presenting these as simplistic trade-offs. The Daodejing questions the human tendency to assert independence from all other existing beings.49 It upholds a concept of the related self as basic. All beings are determined in part by others in their environment. There is not one being that successfully maintains independence from all others in its environment. Each being seeks fulfillment within the boundaries and parameters in its environment. In this context, the curtailment of the immediate needs and interests of particular individuals and groups is not seen as necessarily, or always, negative. Ideally, individuals in that context are able to pursue their interests in a maximal way within their environment. In a fundamental way, the rejection of dualism and its corresponding assertions of separateness of the human species from others, touches on issues of human identity. The Daodejing urges a reevaluation of the conceptual framework that asserts independent human existence. It is perhaps paradoxical that such an attempt to cast doubt upon the significance of human independence actually creates the conditions for the development of a far richer and more substantial meaning of human identity. HOLISM AND I NTEGRITY Within environmental philosophy, holism is articulated in a variety of ways. It operates in many ecocentric accounts, with a variety of meanings.50 However, holism has not received universal acceptance amongst environmental philosophers. Some philosophers are rightly critical of certain versions of environmental holism because they may neglect the needs of individuals. 51 48 See Plumwood (1993) Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, chap. 2: “Dualism: The Logic of Colonisation.” 49 Daodejing 2, 5, 7, 19, 32. 50 There are fine distinctions made between some versions: metaphysical holism (that wholes exist apart from their part and may be more real than their parts), methodological holism (which asserts that in order to understand the constituent parts, we need to understand various phenomena associated with the whole), and ethical holism (that moral consideration should be extended to wholes). See the discussion in Joseph DesJardins, Environmental Ethics, 3rd ed. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Thomson Learning, 2001), pp. 176–77. 51 For example, Eric Katz, “Organiscism, Community and the ‘Substitution Problem,’” Environmental Ethics 7 (1985): 241–56; Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); and Don Marietta, Jr., “Environmental Holism and Individuals,” Environmental Ethics 10 (1988): 251–58. Fall 2003 CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 263 R. P. Peerenboom, in his attempt to apply Daoist views to environmental ethics, relies on a holism with some consideration of outcomes: . . . no individual or species or specimen is a priori entitled to protection. . . . No single criterion is privileged as the criterion. When conflicts arise, the focus turns not to adjudicating according to a fixed rule who is right and who is wrong, but to achieving a harmonization of the disparate interests that will benefit all. 52 Peerenboom is cautious, however, that such harmony may be merely conceptual. He writes: While this interpretation may be philosophically promising . . . [o]ne wonders of how much assistance it will be to the environmental philosopher faced with reallife problems. . . . In actual practice, this process of balancing interests to attain an equilibrium is susceptible to the politics of power . . . [because of] real disparity as some members exercise a greater influence over the end result than others: some are conductors, composers, and maestros; others are bit players. 53 Peerenboom is a little pessimistic regarding the applicability of Daoist philosophy to contemporary environmental debates. It is clear that the “process of balancing interests is susceptible to the politics of power.” However, this is not a problem specific to a Daoist environmental ethic. Peerenboom himself makes this point later in the same essay, that these problems surface in every ethical system. Indeed, the fact that there are power differentials should be engaged with directly, instead of avoided, in environmental debates and negotiations. The contention here is that Daoist philosophy can provide more to environmental ethics than Peerenboom allows it to. As argued previously, holism in Daoist philosophy maintains a sense of individual integrity. The balance between the interdependence of all things and the maintenance of their de, their individual excellences, allows for the realisation of a whole that is not merely the sum of its parts. Rather, the integrity and the stability of the larger whole is valued not because the whole is valued as an end-in-itself, but because these conditions combine to assist in the preservation of the well-being of its constituent parts. Furthermore, the principles of wuwei and ziran highlight the importance of acknowledging the distinctive identities of the many. The endorsement of nondominating or non-intrusive action is a corollary of the imperative to recognize and allow for the spontaneous development of (the many) others. The legitimacy of individuals in their distinctiveness should be adopted as a fundamental feature of any environmental ethic. 52 53 Peerenboom, “Beyond Naturalism,” pp. 20–21. Ibid., p. 21. 264 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS Vol. 25 This view of the self-in-relation and self-in-context necessitates a fundamental change in conceptual frameworks, particularly in philosophies where identity is construed in essentially individualistic and atomistic terms. On this view, impartiality or detachment, for example—or more generally the requirement to treat all like cases alike, irrespective of the individuals or factors involved—would not be accorded priority. Rather, decision making would involve taking into account the particulars involved and the relationships that obtain between them, in the context of the whole. It is also obvious that a viable holistic theory must account for conflict of the sort Peerenboom refers to, where there are power imbalances. The issue of conflict is not simplified within a Daoist axiology proposed in this paper. Indeed, it should be expected that a Daoist assessment of values would culminate in a multitiered account that resists unitary evaluations which reduce or assimilate a wide variety of particulars to the standard. Such an assessment should yield a more complex entanglement of issues: a proper resolution will take into account the interests of individuals, species and of the whole, together with the relevant relations that obtain between individuals within the whole. Clearly, in certain situations, conflict may facilitate development or precipitate positive change. The view articulated in this paper transcends a simplistic view of the whole as a mere sum of its parts. In this more complex view, the whole is not more important than, or independent of its parts; rather, an adequate understanding of individuals comes only when we view them relative to the system of interdependencies in which they exist. Daoist philosophy provides the basis for valuing human and nonhuman individuals and species, and for a proper acknowledgment that individuals may also possess value by virtue of the relations in which they stand, with other beings in the context of the whole. From a holistic perspective, it is clear that not all individuals or groups may achieve their desired outcomes on any one issue and that, at times, compromise is essential. Within the framework of the Daodejing, negotiation and compromise are to be understood in the context of the whole. If this view is accepted, then, like conflict, compromise is not necessarily or always negative. That compromise may have positive effects or outcomes is predicated on a related and contextualized self. Both individuals, and the relations that hold between them, are morally significant. Hence, decisions could be made, for example, that entail a loss for the individual, but which enrich a particular other or others. In this way, the loss suffered by that individual is not a complete or absolute loss. Holism in the Daodejing refers to a comprehensive harmony between the realisation of individual excellence (de) within a context of interdependent, mutual enrichment (dao). In a Daoist environmental ethic, what is ultimately sought is not the satisfaction of all parties concerned but rather a maximally coherent and superlative state of affairs. How this ideal condition might be attained is best demonstrated through analogy. Here, an analogy from philosophy of religion is helpful. Fall 2003 CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 265 Philosophers of religion and theologians have been concerned with the issue of god’s attributes, noting that the set of them taken together—omnipotence, omniscience and maximal goodness—may appear to be internally inconsistent. For instance, doubts have been articulated regarding the traditional understanding of omnipotence, that god is able to do everything; such questions include god’s powers to overturn logical necessities, to change god’s own past, or to conduct evil acts. A traditional response is that god is capable of evil acts, but will not bring them about because god is good. However, this response is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, this approach could lapse into a circularity regarding the definition of good and evil. Second, and more significantly, it does not deal with the root of these problems regarding god’s different attributes. The traditional methodology of assessing god’s attributes has been to take each of these characteristics in turn, and to discuss them independently of god’s other attributes. Such a strategy isolates the different attributes and fails to conceive of them as properties embodied by the one being; the result is a fragmented picture of the one being who embodies these attributes. A solution that has come up in response to this difficulty is one that emphasizes the need to see god as the embodiment of these different characteristics, and appropriately to construe the latter in interplay. On this view, one should see the different characteristics of god not in isolation, but as embodied by the one being. God, in his exercise of abilities, consistently achieves a maximally satisfactory state of affairs. In other words, “. . . the rationale behind ascribing great-making qualities to God is to make explicit the emphatic, central belief that God is perfect or maximally excellent.”54 On this view, god possesses, in the best way possible, his great-making properties: god has the “greatest compossible [co-possible] set of properties.” 55 In practical terms, this would mean that “[i]f God’s being perfectly good in any way limits God’s being allpowerful, it does so only in a fashion that, overall, contributes to the excellence of God.”56 This approach to the issue of god’s attributes in the philosophy of religion could benefit discussion on environmental holism. In particular, the notion of compossibility calls for a recognition and acceptance that, from the point of view of the whole, a maximally fruitful outcome is not necessarily one that attempts to ensure the full satisfaction of all parties involved. The application of this idea to debates about environmental holism yields significant results: decisions are made neither exclusively for the whole and against the individual, nor for the individual and against the whole. Indeed, from the point of view of compossibility, it would appear that such characterizations of holism 54 See Charles Taliaferro, Contemporary Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), p. 74. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 266 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS Vol. 25 are naïve and simplistic. An example of this unhelpful oversimplification of issues is in the presentation of issues regarding the northern spotted owl in the Pacific Northwest ancient forests as a simplistic trade-off between those owls and loggers (“Owl versus Man”), 57 ignoring significant factors such as aspects of the shared environment, other interdependent species which share that habitat, and biodiversity. In order to achieve a maximally compossible state of affairs in an environmental context, the diversity of beings, species, and habitats needs to be taken in to account. It may strike some that the notion of compossibility evoked here, and applied to environmental ethics, is too hazy to be useful. However, a holistic environmental ethic which seeks to recognize all involved, including the relations between beings, their respective places within the environment and both the short-term and long-term effects of particular decisions, will necessarily be wide-ranging and multifaceted.58 That the measure of what is maximally compossible in the case of environmental ethics is not a mere sum of individual happinesses, forces human beings to examine the bases of anthropocentric thinking. Such a holistic environmental ethic, when applied to real-life situations in the contemporary setting, does not necessarily seek a return to the primitive, antitechnological and antidevelopmental way of life: a rejection of anthropocentricism is not necessarily anti-humanitarian. The insights of the Daodejing apply both to the process and attitudes according to which decisions are made about the natural environment. Wuwei is a methodology that allows for spontaneity (ziran), recognizing variety and complexity in value, rather than simplicity and unitariness. Additionally, the Daodejing prompts a critical awareness of the self-in-environment and of interdependence between individuals, species and habitats within the earth environment. This perspective, coupled with an attitude prepared to negotiate and to accept compromise in some situations, would lead to some very significant changes in existing behavioral and consumptive patterns. The Daoist model proposed here is a potent one in challenging the selfishness and shortsightedness of anthropocentricism by arguing that there are no empirical or moral grounds for asserting human superiority and independence. Additionally, the holistic framework provided by Daoist thought provides a stimulus for reassessing human identity beyond the isolated and insulated immediate environments. These elements will provide the bases for a rich and fruitful environmental ethic. 57 Cover story, “Owl versus Man,” Time Magazine, 25 June 1990. The report article itself is not as polarized as the cover suggests, but the point here is how such issues are commonly distorted and misrepresented. 58 A Chinese scholar, Chung-yuan Chang, trans., Tao: A New Way of Thinking (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), suggests that Daoist philosophy upholds a holism that strives to achieve the best “unity of multiplicities.” Chang’s idea resembles the notion of compossibility discussed here.