Confucian moral thinking more

Confucian Moral Thinking Author(s): Karyn L. Lai Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 45, No. 2, Comparative and Asian Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand, (Apr., 1995), pp. 249-272 Published by: University of Hawai'i Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399567 Accessed: 09/04/2008 19:00 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=uhp. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We enable the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. http://www.jstor.org CONFUCIAN MORAL THINKING L. Karyn Lai There are many problemsassociated with studyingnon-Westernphilosophy from within a Western philosophicalframework.'There is abundant literatureon the differences between the two systems, in their categorizationof fields and topics of study, their ways of life, their concerns, their methodologies, and their forms of thought. Apartfrom the initial difficulties often encountered in translation,one needs also to understand analyze a philosophywithin its historicalcontext. This is and true of the study of ways of thinking about morality,since especially moral norms are connected with and rooted in assumptionsand in the value systems specific to sociocultural contexts. Indeed, there is no equivalent of the term 'moral' in classical Chinese.2 The definition of abstractand metaphysicalconcepts without simultaneouslyconsidering their practical manifestationsis nonexistent in the classical Confucian tradition.It will be shown in this essay that, within the Confuciancontext, moral rules do not have ultimacy in human life in the sense that moral normscannot be construedas universal,impartial, objective principles. This, as Rosemontsuggests, is unlike the case of contemporary 'Western'moralphilosophy: ... the term'morals'is almostuniformly takenas circumscribing culturally the specific concept-clusterlisted above [i.e., freedom, liberty,autonomy, individual, utility,rationality, objective, subjective,choice, dilemma,duty, rights, and ought], now referred as "rights-based" to theories and principles.In the several and variedaccounts put forwardby writersin this field, moral issues involve the weighing of rationalargumentson behalf of putative universal principles,which are possible optionsfor guidingthe specific actionsof freely choosing, autonomous individuals.In this field the early Confucians,along with most other nonwesternthinkers,will not be found; nor, for that matter, will Aristotle.... It is by no means just the early Chinese we will fundamenif western tally misunderstand we imposethe concept clusterof contemporary moralphilosophyon ancient texts.3 at the University of New SouthWales Lecturer the in Schoolof Philosophy Apartfrom presuppositionsmade regardinghuman free will, individualism, and autonomy, 'Western'views often constructmoralityon an individualistic basis wherebymoreweight is assignedto the character, virtue,or behaviorof the individualmoralagent than to the interestsand lives of other agents. They focus on what each person, qua moralagent, does, ratherthan on what the communityas a whole does together.The latteris one of the primary characteristics Confucianthought. of in examininga philosophythat crosses culturaland linguistic Thus, boundaries,one should be aware, firstof all, that one is alreadylimited by the vocabularyand discourseof one's own philosophicalframework. In addition,the following points have also to be noted: PhilosophyEast& West Volume 45, Number2 1995 April 249-272 ? 1995 of by University Hawaii Press 249 IE:, 1C, 1F, , ,, (a) that philosophies have to be situated within their historical contexts; (b) that categoriesmust be applied with caution;and (c) that "it does not follow that [another]philosophy, in orderto be philosophy, must cover the same problems [as the one/s in the traditionin which the philosopherhas been trained]."4 The title of this essay, "ConfucianMoral Thinking,"suggests an examinationof the ways in which thoughtsabout being moralare structuredand how they are justified-or fail to be justified-and, generally, how moralvalues and normsare constructedand conceptualizedwithin the largerphilosophicalframework the Confuciansystem itself. of In this essay, I show that some common criticisms of Confucian moral philosophy from some Western philosophical perspectives are mistaken in the sense that they fail to observe the principles covered in (a), (b),and (c) and, morespecifically,in the sense thatthese criticisms are superficialbecause they arise from an evaluation of one system in of one set terms of the value structures another,thereby superimposing of evaluative structuresover another. In doing so, I am not, however, arguingfor Confucianmoral philosophy as a "better"or a "more perof fect" moralsystem. Rather,I show that, with a deeper understanding the Confucian system as a whole, differentproblems arise-problems that are in fact inherentin the system and not merely based on cultural or relativity on evaluativeperceptionsof the world. In the first section, I describe each of several Confucianconcepts that are relevantto the Confucianmoraloutlook. It is essentialthatthese concepts be understoodand analyzed within the conceptual framework of Confucianthought.The concepts discussed here are:cheng-ming,jen, f hsiao, shu, and tao. The explicationof these concepts serves a second li, I and systemof purpose:it demonstrates, contend, an important different of moral philosophyfrom that of contemporary Western categorization moralphilosophy. The second section discusses two specific problemswith the Confucian way of thinkingabout moralityand demonstrates how, with some modification,the severityof these problemsmightbe mitigated.Then,on a more optimisticnote, I suggest how Confucianthoughtmight be relecontexts. vant, and indeed contribute,to moralthinkingin contemporary I. Conceptsand Categoriesin ConfucianPhilosophy Confucius constructedan idealized community based on what he MW4 ~ thoughtwere the meritsof the hierarchicalChou feudal system. Book 4 *g ~of the Shu Ching,5titled "The Great Plan," sets out in detail a(n ideal) model for feudal governmentbased on the perfectcharacterof the king and on his perfect governmental measures-a distinctly Confucian East Philosophy &West theme. Section 5 of this book reads in part: 250 The sovereign havingestablished(in himself)the highestdegree and pattern of excelence, concentratesin his own personthe five (sourcesof) happiness, Thenthey, on and proceedsto diffusethem, and give them to the multitudes. theirpart,embodyingyour perfection,will give it (back)to you, and preserve and practiceit.... This text describes a situation in which the ruler is almost solely responsiblefor the social, material,and moralconditionsof the country. It is taken as a foregone conclusion that if the sovereign is a good one, the multitudeswill respond appropriately, result being happiness, the and peace throughoutthe country. His good rule ensures wellorder, orderedhierarchiesnot only in the political arena but also in the moral, social, and familialsettings.The idea that these differentlevels of order in a countryare interconnectedand interdependent expressed in difis ferent ways in the Shu Ching passage quoted above. They include the following observatons: (a) there cannot be orderin the familyand in the largersocial setting if the emperorfails to orderthe state; a good emperor will, through his characterand deeds, effect (b) changes, not only in the living conditions, but also in the behaviorof the masses; (c) an emperorwho cannot play his role in his familycan never rule the countrywell. One can immediatelyidentifythe manypresuppositions assumpand I tions in this shortparagraph; now move on to discuss, in greaterdetail, the important concepts in Confucianmoralphilosophythat underliethe of thinkingoutlined above. ways A. Cheng-ming.The term ming, which is literallytranslatedas "name," IEt although "label" better captures its Confucian usage, has practical implicationsin Confuciantheory:if names are not in order,then words and language cannot be properlyused; this, in turn, leads to the situation whereby deeds cannot succeed (Analects13:3). The concern here is not with metaphysicaltheories of how 'names' function as signs or symbols or with how these symbolsare connected with realitybut, rather, already assumes an important connection between languageand reality.Indeed, this connection is significantin a moral sense, for the theory of chengthe ming pertainsto human relationships; thrustof this doctrine is that termsused to designatethe rangeof humanrelationships carrywith them not only descriptivecontent but also evaluativeforce (Analects13:3.15). Forexample, Confuciussaid in Analects4:5.2 that the chun tzu (the Confucian'gentleman')without virtue cannot fulfillthe requirements of that name. This meansthat moralvirtueis already'builtinto'the concept of chun tzu such that the term has a moral 'loading'; it has evaluative force such that one who does not act accordingto the requirements im- Karyn Lai L. 251 plied by the name should not be addressedas such. Chad Hansen proof poses thatthe Confuciandoctrineof rectification names was intended to have a regulativefunction: Thetermsand namesinvolvedin the rectification namesare thosethat of function the traditional in code:man,king,brother, Thepurpose the son. of rectification to createan ideal language moraldiscrimination, is for evaluationandaction.... Thus whileinearly Western thereis a kindof philosophy that role lies the assumption the primary of language in describing worldand ideas ... communicating or beliefsaboutthe world,Confucian 'rectification of names'operates the presupposition the primary function lanof on that use be attitudes choiceandaction.Language should guageis to instil guiding as of manipulated a means socialcontrol.6 of Hansen'sinterpretation the theoryis consistentwith the sayings in the Analects regardingcheng-ming. Particularly interestingis his stress on the regulativefunction of the theory;this is entirely consistent with another aspect of the theory: its evaluative function. Thus it is a prescriptivetheory:7individualshave to live appropriately accordingto the titles and names, indicatingtheir ranksand statuseswithin relationships, by which they are referred to. These terms prescribe how values upholding the various roles are to be realized within the fundamental of reality of the lived human world. Whatever the interpretation the of the ontology of names, what was importantto underlyingtheory Confuciuswas that a relationshiphad to be construedas a role which carriesrank,status,and social position, and, consequently,as encapsulatingbehavioralrequirements. ForConfucius,this moral theory is rooted in the naturalorder of a community. Thus, Confucius' advice to the ruler to first rectify names is not meant to urge a change in the usage of names, but ratherto ensure that the names in question are applied to persons fittingthe moral stations associated with those names, or to ensure that persons have to change in orderto live up to the name they carry.Termssuch as 'father', 'ruler','friend',and so on bringwith them implicationsof relationships, and have normative import. Therefore, in an ideally well-balanced and orderedsociety, "chun chun (chun tzu), chen chen (official),fu fu of tzu (father), tzu (son)"(Analects12: 11). Translation this lastpassage is difficult,given that the originalsaying in Chinese is itselfvague. A plauconsistent with other themes in the Analects is to sible interpretation considerthe firsttermof each pairas the name or noun, and the second & Philosophy est as the verb;each noun-verbpairsignifiesthatthe people fillingthe variEast ous positions carry out their duties in a way befittingtheir labels: the ministerministers,the fatherfathers,and so forth. The second term of each pairthus describesan activity:that of prince-ingor that of son-ing. Philosophy East & West The point in this passage, therefore, lies in verbalizingthe noun. The 252 person referredto by the name lives, necessarily, according to his designation.8 The well-governed polity is, at the same time, the well-ordered society because the members each understandtheir roles and accordof inglyfulfillwhat is required them. Thereis overwhelmingemphasis,in Confuciantexts, on not behaving in ways that are considered"out many of place" in accordance with one's status. This idea of acting appropriately-say, as wife, son, or younger brother-was a theme so deeply entrenched in Confucian philosophy that the Analects records an instancewhen Confuciushimselfcommentedthat the adult-likeabilities of a child were indeed inappropriate: Someone A boy fromthe villageof Ch'uehused to come with messages. himself?" master The askedhimsaying,"Ishe improving said, "Judging by of the way he sits in grown-up people'splacesand walksalongside other people olderthan himself,I shouldsay thathe was bent upon gettingon himself." than rather uponimproving (14:47) quickly This negative example of development describes the boy acting in a in way that is beyond what is appropriate a properchild-adultrelationis What makes his behaviorinappropriate that he attemptsto "walk ship. in other words, assumes equal statuswith people older alongside," or, than himselfand, as such, does not know his place, or simplychooses to ignore it. In either case the behavior calls for reproachbecause such violations have the potentialto underminethe finely-balancedhomeostatic model of the Confuciancommunity.The well-regulatedsociety is accordone in which people carryout theirresponsibilities appropriately ing to their particularplaces in the social structure;it is only with the cooperationof each individualwithin the communitythat the common to good can be attained.On the other hand, it is also important remember that excellence for the human person can only be attained within the communal context. The symbiotic relationbetween individualand communal good is predicatedupon the Confucianbelief that, as human beings, we share the one common human nature,which has its locus essentiallyand thus meaningfully only withinthe communalcontext;jen is this shared human nature. B. Jen. The etymology of jen consists of, on one half, the charactersig- t nifying'human',and on the other, the charactersignifying'two'. It suggests not only relatednessbetween at least two beings belonging to the human species, but, more importantly,their interdependence. In this connection, jen is describedas reciprocity(shu)(Analects12:2). It is recorded in Analects 1:4 of one of Confucius' disciples that his selfexamination consisted in evaluating his relationshipswith others, this L. practicebeing based on the idea that the individualin relationto others Karyn Lai 253 constitutesan important element in self-evaluation.The ideas of human relatednessand reciprocityare based on the Confucianview of human beings as sharinga similar natureand, consequently, as being similarin-kind.This is because jen covers more than the merely moral,and the one sense of jen that is consistentwith all its uses in the Analectsis that it is the substratum, source,of all humanvirtue,of which the moralis but the a part.Jen is moral in naturebut also at the same time transcendsmere morality.Describingit as 'humanvirtue'is consistentwith the idea that it is both endowed and yet to be developed. Jen appearsto representthe ultimatemoralachievementin personal,social, and culturallife. It is the of manifestcharacteristic the humanpersononce s/he has cultivatedthe virtuesand embraced its variousaspects in living out life. The meaning of jen integratesother importantconcepts such as love, community, and the power to create within the relationshipsinto interrelatedness, which one enters. Because differenthuman relationshipshave their own contexts of it meaning and appropriateness, is not possible to generalize over the infinite manifestationsof human virtue within the context of human Difficultiesin interpreting arise fromthe fact that Conjen relationships. fucius used the term differentlyin differentcontexts. It could be argued, that furthermore, Confucius' lack of definitionof jen demonstratesthat he wanted the scope of jen to apply indefinitely.Itseriouslynarrowsthe Confucian enterpriseto think of it merely as a moral philosophy and consequently to characterizeit according to the categories appropriate only to moralphilosophy in the Westernphilosophicaltradition.Consedistinctionexists only on the theoretical quently, the individual-society because it is manifestas shared humanity,can only be cultilevel; jen, vated and developed within the context of the human community.9In and this connection, because li (propriety) upholdthe hierarchies powers that propel human social life and furtherfacilitate human social bethe havior,they are inseparablylinkedwith jen throughout Analects. C. Li. Li are necessaryfor the maintenanceof roles and statuseswithin the Confucianhierarchicalorder. They dictate rightbehavior and decorum within relationshipsand guide relationshipssuch as the ones between children and parents(Analects2:5), subject and ruler(Analects 3:18), and prince and minister(Analects3:19). Li serve to mark out actions differentiated roles;they supportand uphold these hierarchies:10 to one's status or were considered appropriate inappropriate according in a particular relationship. Lias used by Confuciusalso retaina sense of ritualbehavior-as the term was originally used to denote-a sense of ritualthat focuses on more than the merely formaland which has deeper moral and cultural East West significance.This is indicated in Confucius'comment in Analects 15:4 & Philosophy 254 that Shun, one of the sage-kings,had governed efficientlywithout exertion; he did nothing except to face south-the ruler's ritual posture. Indeed, in this passage, the two aspects of li-ritualistic and social-are assimilated such that the ruler who governs according to li does so and yet efficiently.The similarities between li in the ritualistic effortlessly and in the social senses are importantin the articulation the concepof tion of li in the Analects.We turnto these similarities. First,the performanceof a ritual is disciplined and is carried out according to the rules pertainingto ritual,which is often highly contextualized. Likewise, 1i as norms of appropriateness governing social behavior involve discipline in individual action according to what counts as normativewithin the context of the community. Secondly, the practiceof ritualassumes interactionbetween at least two parties-often between the human and the divine. On the more practical level, li guide human interactionand also presupposeat least two parties,and "the problemof li does not even occur when one has absolutelynothingto relateto."11 Thirdly, ritual behavior is patterned and therefore, as the term 'ritual'itself denotes, becomes polished aftersome practice and is also done with a certainease. Acting accordingto li within the social sphere allows one to participatein social 'ceremony': one becomes socially competent and interactswith others-understanding what is requiredby various roles within various relationships-with seeming effortlessness. Fingarette12 presentsli as havingsome 'magical'qualityin the sense that when it is practiced, relationshipsfunction smoothly and social life is seen as "ceremony." Although Fingarette's thesis has been variously criticized,13it does provide an interestingperspective from which to understandthe mechanism of ii. Furthermore, is hard to dispute his it point that ii is significantlyrelatedto the cultivationof meaningfulrelationships because li have deeper significance than the purely external of aspects of performance actions. a very important Fourthly, similaritybetween ritualand social interaction as guided by li, accordingto Confucius,is the 'spirit'with which one performsthat action: "by its essentially humanistic-religious and artisticorigin, by its very nature,an act of li is expressiveand indicative of one's cultivated, native human emotion or feeling, which Confucius called jen."14 Accordingly, it is recorded (in Analects 3:12) that Confucius sacrificedto the spiritsof the dead (ancestors), and to the gods, as if they were present;he also commented that if he did not participatein the ritual,then it is as if he did not sacrificeat all. Finally,li has an aestheticaspect, just as many ritualsdo. Ritualscan be modifiedand, indeed, are variedand variableand manifestdifferently as they pertain to each differentsituation and to each particularrelaL. tionship, althoughthey may providegeneral guidelines for each kind of Karyn Lai 255 relationship.Forexample, Confuciusrecountshow he modifiedvarious li in relationto worship in the ancestraltemple, in Analects 9:3.15 It is to thus not appropriate categorize li in terms of 'rightness'or of 'moral correctness'.The focus is ratheron the value of human action, and, in in thatcontext, on whetherone has acted appropriately a situationgiven the nature of the relationship.Thus, li both involve a sense of moral appropriatenessin evaluating human action and center distinctly on in human relationships. The idea of appropriateness, turn,connotes the element of refinementand culture;in Analects 8:2.1, li are viewed as being necessaryto social behaviorand, indeed, as providingan aesthetic sheen to human interaction: without li, becomes laboriousbustle;carefulness,without ii, Respectfulness, becomes timidity;boldness, without li, becomes insubordination; straightforwardness,withoutli, becomes rudeness.16 01 The readingof li offeredin this articleallows individualinitiativeand in of inputinto one's interpretation what mightbe appropriate particular situations.Likemany contemporaryrenditionsof Confucianthought, it reads into the notions of li flexibilityin the applicationof oneself to the varietyof situationsin human life. A. S. Cua, in explainingthis flexibility, refersto what Wing-tsitChan termsthe ching-chuanprinciple:ching is while "an invariablerule, a standardof conduct, constant, recurring"; and chuan pertainsto "exigency, circumstances,that which is irregular, to ching, that which is constant or normal-from this comes, opposed therefore,the idea of temporary."17 Applied to moral theory, Cua sugthe doctrineof ching-chian is a theoryof the normaland the exigests, gent, or the exceptional. While the formeris an "invariablerule in the sense of a rule regularlyand invariablyapplied to situationsor actions that fall within the scope of its application,"the latterapplies in situations in real life that "appearto fall outside the scope of the application of rules."Cua's descriptionallows a certainflexibilityin moral practice that strict deontological and rule-based theories will not admit since with regardto the flexibility invariablyleads to a sense of arbitrariness of a rule or principle.The argumentfor a readingof li as not application purely formalistic,yet not totally contingenton the whims of the moral in substantiated the next section, in which a (or immoral) agent, is further connection is drawnbetween jen and li. D. Jen and Li. Li and jen were linked together inseparablyin the Analects, and it needs to be noted that there is little or no suggestionthat either of the two concepts had fundamentalprecedence over the other. of Confuciusemphasisedboth the importance li to jen (Analects12: 1: to controloneself accordingto li, that is jen) and of jen to li (Analects3:3: East Philosophy &West "If a man is not jen, what has he to do with li?")without assumingthe 256 primacyof either concept. In the light of these passages, Tu Wei-ming's statementthat "jen as an innermoralityis not caused by the mechanism of li fromoutside. Itis higher-order concept which gives meaningto li"18 is problematicbecause it suggeststhatjen is more fundamentalin a significantway: it is a higher-order concept fromwhich li derives meaning. to Tu's statement,however, Confuciusstatedto Yen Yuan, Contrary in Analects 12: 1: one learnsto be jen throughconductinglife according to li. AlthoughConfuciusdid use jen in the sense of 'inner'componentto the 'outer' manifestation li in passages in the Analects, he wanted to of eliminate this distinctionwhen it came to practicalaction in the sense that to embody one without the other would be meaningless (Analects 8:8, 20:3). The relationbetween li and jen could perhapsbe described as approximating the relationbetween formand substancein Western to Cua suggestssomethingto this effect: philosophy. Liappearsto be the conventionthat defines the formand possibilityof moral actions. In this sense, li defines the conventionallyaccepted style of actions, i.e. the formand possibilityof moralachievementwithin the culturalsetting, or what may be termed'culturallifestyle'.... In a more contemporary idiom, we may expressthis idea in termsof the tie or contactof an individualagent's actions with the culturalform of life which gives them the locus of identificationand the possibilityof moralachievement.19 Although Confucius was more concerned with social expedience than with moral absolutes, he did not believe that moral norms are therefore reducible to social norms. Such a reduction is avoided in Confucianism because its emphasis is on good human relationships based upon an affirmation the value of human life. And that which of the value of the human is not merelysubjectto social consensus upholds and to the statusquo. To that effect, Confuciusrejectedthe practiceof ii without comprehendingits meaning and understanding significance, its that such practice is mere empty formalism: ceremonies, be "In arguing than extravagant; funerals,be deep in sorrowrather in than thriftyrather shallow in sentiment"(Analects3:4.3; also, 3:26, 17:11). Superficiality is condemned, not only at a personallevel but, more importantly, the at level of the community.The good villager, "who, though he acted as if he were following the Confucian norms, was actually only following convention without consciously engaging in moral practice at all."20 Such a man Confuciusdespised as being a "thiefof virtue." Li,therefore,derives from a varietyof sources, includingone's personal virtue, a communally shared knowledge, and establishedvalues. These establishedstandardshave evolved fromthe ethical and aesthetic insights of those who have experienced similar situations in the past, and, therefore,Confucius comments that he is not an innovatorbut a transmitter. L. Adaptedto currentsituations,li has a polyphonic meaning Karyn Lai 257 and means more than mere social convention. Indeed, it could be characterized as "an aesthetic expressionof naturalhuman feeling," denoting "only those patterns or norms of social behaviour that tend to mutuallyexalt the characterand dignityof the participants."21 Therefore,li allows the developmentof jen in a social context and, consequently,opens the way for one to engage in self-analysisthrough appropriately perceivingoneself as a social being. By actingaccordingto in li, one internalizesthe variouscodes of conduct that are appropriate one's social environmentand that pertainto the variousroles one plays. Lifunction as the catalystfor transmitting jen in each person as the the basis for harmony in the community. Accordingly, personal virtue is subsumed under communal virtue. Such social harmonycan only be realized if the membersof a communityrecognize and act in a morally responsiblemanner in their response to others. Accordingto the Confucians,and especially to Mencius,this begins withinthe familycontext. E. Hsiao. A large proportionof Confucius'sayings focus on hsiao (filial piety); it is often referredto when discussing virtue. At one point it is even referredto as the root of jen (Analects 1:2)-an assertionof the priorityof hsiao in the order of human relationships.Hsiao could be considered as a duty of obedience and respectto one's parents.On the other hand, it has been emphasizedthat hsiao begins with one's parents: one learnshow to be filial by observingone's parents; Confuciussaid, in Analects 2:6, that hsiao means "parentsare anxious lest their children of partof the responsibility being filial get sick." This places the primary on the parents,althoughwhat is demanded of children is differentfrom what is demanded of parents. This two-sided definition of filial piety in The starting point of presupposesmutualresponsibility a relationship. of to filial piety is actuallythe responsibility parentsto demonstrate their to children the concern and love appropriate the parent-childrelationqualitiesthat the childrenappropriately ship. It is to these demonstrated respond. The basis for assertingthe priorityof hsiao, upon which other relationships are modeled, is the idea that one's immediate family is the natural startingpoint for valuable and meaningful relationships.The Confuciansfelt that the relationshipsinto which one entered needed to be differentiatedaccording to priority and type of responsibilities involved. Hsiao is not the mere formalityof extendingcourtesyto one's the parents,for it "does not consist merely in young people undertaking hard work, when anything has to be done, or serving their elders first with wine and food. It is something much more than that" (Analects 2:8). Care and concern within the family is developed, and this has far& East West reachingeffects, felt beyond familyboundaries: Philosophy 258 to the Whatis meantby "Inorderrightly govern state,it is necessary to first the for is while regulate family," this:-It is notpossible one to teachothers, he cannotteachhis own family. the without Therefore, ruler, goingbeyond hisfamily, for the is completes lessons the state.There filialpiety:-therewith the sovereign shouldbe served.Thereis fraternal submission:-therewith shouldbe served.Thereis kindness:-therewith eldersand superiors the multitude shouldbe treated.... [W]hen ruler, a father, son, and a the as a is him.22 brother, a model,thenthe peopleimitate It is assumed that the attitudesand emotions that are characteristic of life are stable and strong.Filialpiety is a principleof social happyfamily action and also a moral virtue within Confucianthought;from the primary context of familial attachment one learns the signifcance of the engaging with others in a meaningfuland responsibleway, affirming interrelatedness humanbeings. of F. Shu. An integralaspect of Confucianmoral life is the interrelatedness , of human beings. Confuciusemphasized shu, reciprocity,as an expression of one's mutual responsibilityin a relationship.In living the Confucian life, one has to respondappropriately those with whom one has to a relationship; one is responsiveto other people and mutuallyresponsible for one's relationships accordingto the role(s)one mightfill in that an educatoror a business partner. as, relationship say, Lifeas a totally independent,nonrelatedindividualis unacceptable in Confucian thought (Analects 18:6), and, as argued previously, an account of virtueor value that emphasizes personalexcellence in isolation is deemed meaningless.The articulationof what it means to act in the mannerof shu occupies a central position in the Analects; it is, in shortthe "golden rule":Do not do to otherswhat you do not wish to be done to yourself(Analects5 :11).23 The golden rule assumes a similarity-in-kind among human beings such that, throughthe interpolation personalwants and interests,one of is able to workout anotherperson'swants and interests.(Whether such a is warrantedis highly questionable and is, indeed, inconpostulation sistentwith Confucius'vehement insistencethat people are, and should This theme of shu is not a call to unending be, socially differentiated.) dedicationto the cause of otherswhile one neglects one's own, because the self is, clearly,the startingpoint and, especially for the chun tzu, the locus of virtue. Confucius also stresses a loyalty to oneself (chung), ,, relatingchung and shu as the 'i-kuan',24 allegedly the single theme that best captures Confucian moral dynamics. Wing-tsit Chan comments, 4:15: regarding of Han and T'angtimes adheredto the basic meaningof "thread" L. and Karyn Lai ... Confucianists have not agreedon what it means. Generally,Confucianists 259 *4. understoodit in the sense of a systemor a body of doctrines.Chu Hsi, trueto the spiritof Neo-Confucian speculativephilosophy,took it to mean thatthere is one mindto respondto all things.... All agree, however,on the meanings of chung and shu, which are best expressed by Chu Hsi, namely, chung means the full developmentof one's [originally good] mind and shu means the extensionof that mindto others.25 The determination of what counts as appropriate response has to be worked out within the framework of the nature of the relationship. Thus shu encompasses a moral aspect based on one's appropriate responses according to one's role in a particular relationship. It is in this light that 'reciprocity' seems to be an inadequate translation of shu because 'reciprocity' suggests an equivalent 'pay-back' response. This is, however, clearly not what shu means-for example, in a teacher-pupil relationship, where it would be extremely peculiar for the teacher to expect to be taught by a pupil (although that might be a by-product of teaching) in response to the teacher as an educator. In Confucian thought, the existing inequality of people in terms of their personal development is constituted by differences in social, moral, and relational terms. Ch'u expresses the different statuses within ancient Chinese society that were articulated in the Confucian system: The distinctionsbetween noble and humble, superiorand inferiorwere ... based upon the talent and virtue of each member of the society, and constituteda type of social selection conditioned by social success. In addition, differencesfound expressionin the kinshipsystem. These were based further on criteriaof generation, age, degree of relationship,and sex. Status and modes of behavior in the larger society were determined by the fact of in and superiority inferiority, a family,by the degree of nearnessand remoteThe and and ness, superiority inferiority, seniorityand juniority. primary rights of consumptionbelonged to the fatheras againstthe sons, to the elder brother as againsta younger brother,all types of labor or services being demanded and of from the junior groups, thus establishingrelationships subordination and also The superordination. so-called rulesof filial piety and brotherhood, of femininebehavior,were based on this.26 This concept of difference could perhaps be made sense of in the light of another idea-the tao; Confucius advised that those whose tao are different should not lay plans for one another (Analects 15:39). Tao here seems to refer to a perspectival worldview. A PhilosophyEast& West G. Tao. The meaning of tao is especially difficult to discern. This is connected with the fact that tao has no one meaning even within the Confucian tradition itself. What can be said about it, though, is that it does not have the metaphysical dimensions of absoluteness, of allencompassing reality, and so on, that the term connotes in Taoist thought. Tao as used by the classical Confucians has a range of mean- 260 ings, fromthe personalto the cosmological. Withinthe arena of human action, however, tao seems to denote an open-ended enterpriseof the development of the self within the larger sociocultural context (and which, especially in Neo-Confucianphilosophy,was relatedto the cosmological order).More generally,tao can be conceived of as the shared as jen, and, in particular, differentorientations similarityof humankind, toward human life within the world order, constitutingone's specific point of view and consequentlyaffectingone's perceptionof the world. Sandra A. Wawrytko, in "Confucius and Kant: The Ethics of Respect,"offers a more metaphysicaland absolutistconception of tao, explaining it in terms of the Kantian Moral Law.27 According to Wawrytko,there is a similaritybetween tao and the Moral Law that is based on the idea that both referto a universaland unwavering standard. In turn, this is based on the idea of respect for persons in the two philosophies:while respectfor other persons,accordingto Kant,arisesfrom the recognition that people are rationalbeings, Confucius taught that respect between persons must temperthe superior-inferior relationships within society. In addition, Wawrytkoemphasizes both the concept of (i righteousness or yi) in Confucianthoughtas the Mean and the role that it plays in the moral life of the Confucianperson. AlthoughWawrytko'sstudy is an interestingone, she has dangerously narrowedthe Confucian concept of tao in renderingit as being analogous to the KantianMoral Law. While Kant'sMoral Law is not unconnected with his views on human nature, it is primarilya moral theory. In Confucianphilosophy,one could never successfullyseparate, and understanda 'moral' portion independent of the larger philosophical context. Implicitin Confucius'teachings is the belief that personhood is not and cannot be compartmentalized:the self is at once the social, moral, political, and intellectual.Wawrytkomisunderstands realm of the moral in Confucianthought while at the same time vastly the reducingand narrowing scope and applicabilityof concepts such as tao. In this connection, it is useful to understandthe self-cultivation process as an open-ended one-what Hall and Ames term "personHall and Ames offera lucid argumentagainstconstruingtao making."28 as some order of transcendentprinciple. They argue that such a conof ception results in an impoverishment Confucius' conception of the human being and furthercontradictsConfucius'perception of personmakingas an open-ended activity. I will not reproduceHall and Ames' argumenthere, though I agree with them. Thatthe tao is not some predeterminedobjective 'path' is clearly demonstratedin Confucius'statement in Analects 15:28 that it is the human which rendersvalue to the tao, and not the tao that makesthe human magnificent. Schwartzalso understands as encompassinga range of different Karyn Lai L. tao 261 meaningsand scopes. He writes,"in its most extended meaning, it refers to nothing less than the total normativesociopoliticalorderwith its networks of proper familial and proper sociopolitical roles, statuses and of ranks,as well as to the 'objective' prescriptions properbehaviourritual, ceremonial, and ethical-that govern the relationshipsamong these roles. On the other side, it obviously and emphatically also embracesthe 'inner'morallife of the living individual."29 This means that moral normsas such within Confucianphilosophy are not accorded ultimacy.Instead,being a relationship-based philosophy, what is importantis that one acts responsiblywithin one's social and culturalenvironmentand accordingto the roles one occupies in the one engages in. The distinctivenessof each pervarietyof relationships son, although all share in the same quality of being jen, rests in the one engages in; this inteof (successful)integration all the relationships be described as the process of becoming jen. Thus, grationmight aptly for example, I am at once a daughter,friend,wife, teacher, employee, colleague, and so on. This does not mean, however, that each person is completely constitutedby the roles s/he plays. Rather,the quality and Confucianlife is based on how one fulfillsthe meaningof a satisfactory within each relationship. responsibilities Thus,the Confucianlife is a dynamic process whereby one's way of life changes according to how one's relationshipsmight have changed (though changing relationshipsare, obviously, not the only cause of change in ways of life). Tu Wei-ming describes the dynamics of this process, distinguishingbetween Confucian and un-Confucianways of understanding personhood: a of Thedramatic personwho assumes variety social imageof the modern the unConfucian. ideaof my assuming roleof son in The rolesis definitely and and the to reference myfather simultaneously assuming distinct separate From if in to roleof father reference my son is unnatural, notdistasteful. my to ... own experience I havealwaysbeen learning be a son. Sincemyson's to and I to birth, havealsobeenlearning be a father mylearning be a son has a of as to takea new significance a result becoming father myself.Futheris and more,mybeinga son anda father also informed enriched beinga by and a a a student, teacher, husband, colleague,a friend, an acquaintance. to Thesearewaysforme to learn be human.30 As Tu writes,how one conducts oneself in the rangeof relationships one engages in constitutesways of being human. Each individualis a necessaryand distinctnode within a web-like networkof differentrelain combinationsand tionships,and these differentrelationships, different make for the distinctivenessof each human life. Affirmapermutations, tion of the qualityof life as such can only be achieved within the netEast Philosophy &West work of humanrelationships. 262 The next section discusses two specific problemswith the Confucian conception of the ideal communityand constructssome possible replies before moving on to suggest the relevance to contemporarymoral philosophy of some Confucianways of thinkingabout morality. II.The ConfucianCommunity One potentialproblemwith classical Confucianthoughtis thatthere is a belief in maintainingdifferentiation among people. Althoughit is a fact that there are hierarchicalstructuresoperating in any society, to insist that there is actually a moral aspect in maintaininghierarchyand social inequality would seem grossly unpalatable,especially to those who uphold the rightsof individualsand the respect for differenceand who thus see a need to eliminate inequalityin favorof more egalitarian structures.For there is a great gap between the mere observationof a featureof a particular communityand the suggestionthatthere is indeed or some value in preserving enforcingthatfeature. at Problematically, times, Confuciusdid seem to be protectingthe "Li nobility, for he did make the remark: is not applicable to the common people; punishmentis not applicableto the ta-fu(officials),"31 thus -kA drawinga sharp distinctionbetween those who were, supposedly, able to exercise responsibility over themselves and others who were not. In the addition,when in 513 B.C. state of Chin set out to publicize the penal M Confuciuscriticized, saying, "Chin is going to ruin. It has lost its laws, (proper)rules (of administration).... [P]eople will study the tripods,and not care to know their men of rank.And what professioncan the superThiscomplaintof Confucius'reflectsthe ideology of nobles iors keep?"32 who felt that this move threatenedtheirauthority a rulingclass.33 as to contend that Confuciussought to uphold the hierarchy However, and to protectthe elite minorityprovides only partof Confucius'rationale regarding good government.The contention is inadequatebecause it ignores his insistentemphasis, appearingmany times in the Analects, that it was especially the ruling nobility, with their pronounced responsibilities,who needed to be morally responsiblefor their conduct. What could actually be criticized, instead, is Confucius'idealism-not unlike that of Plato-in thinkingthat there could be a philosopher-king, or chun tzu, who was a paradigmof virtueand moralresponsibility and who could, throughhis moralachievements,influencethe ruledmajority. than any deontological moraltheory Obviously more particularistic or univerzalisability criterion could admit, the Confucian prescription forces one to make choices and to accord differentpriorities the varito ety of people one comes across. Distinguishingbetween people is not advocated crudely, as a means to effect discrimination, ratheras a but means to work out one's responsibilities, whether as partner,friend, or L. colleague. It seems, in the light of Confuciantheory, naive to insistthat Karyn Lai 263 all should be treated equally, or loved equally, or to try to achieve a social setting in which relational values are not accorded any significance played down or eliminated. A Confucian scholar who was himselfbroughtup withinthe Westernphilosophicaltradition,Benjamin Schwartzcomments that he sharesthe Westernprejudicesagainst hierarchy and authority.However, he also admitsthat it is important understand differentmindsetwhere people take pride in to a within the hierarchical station in which they find themselves. Even in living the West, this was the case in, say, Shakespeare's work:hierarchy, status,and are accepted. And the need for hierarchy, and rote status,authority, authority behaviorin our society may be a fact thatwe cannot live up to. Inthis respect, perhapsthe nationsof EastAsia are more honest.34 A positive aspect of the Confucianemphasis on hierarchyis that it places greater responsibilityon those on the higher rungs of the hierarchy. In fact, most of Confucius'sayings were directedat the chun tzu and not at the rest of the people. What this means is that ratherthan demandingthat the people allow themselves to be subordinated,Confucius is reminding leadersof the immense responsibilities the they have on theirhands.Thus,importantly, appropriate the on the partof response the governedensues as a consequence of appropriately fulfilledresponsibilitieson the partof the governing,and not vice versa. De Barynotes that such reminders responsibility not out of place: of are [W]henConfuciusspeaks of the chun tzu as someone especially carefuland one the restrained, who is punctiliousabout not overstepping boundsof what is right,it is not because he expects ordinarymen to exercise the same circumspectionor constrainthemselvesto the same degree, but because those he addresseshave a heightened visibilityand potentiallymore far-reaching influenceon others,to say nothingof theirrole in directingothers'laborsand in the distribution material of goods.35 If (moral)responsibility an integralcomponent of social hierarchy,as is passages in the Analectssuggest, it then follows that those on the lower levels of the hierarchy could actually participate in the process of requiringthat their superiorslive and act responsibly.This idea is persuasive in the context of political leadership. A second problem with Confucius'constructionof the ideal comNot only is such a munityis that it is built upon a family-typestructure. constructionidealistic;it is also (morally) to inappropriate assumethatall should be similarto family ones. It ignores the empirical relationships fact that family relationshipsinvolve a whole, differentset of values, loyalties, caring, feeling, and closeness, which are differentfrom nonfamilialrelationships. withinthe Values and feelings that are appropriate context-for example, that between motherand child-are often familiy in PhilosophyEast& West inappropriate others-such as that between employerand employee. 264 From the moral perspective, it would be a peculiar kind of society, indeed, if all people were relatedin family-typebonds. It is questionable whether it is morally expedient for the individual to be subjected to demands of obedience and to have his or her life determinedto such a largeextent not only by those within the familybut by those outside it as well, particularly given the type of obligations involved in family relaof a Confuciankind. tionships There is an inherent inconsistency within the Confucian system because, while it seeks to emphasize the special and fundamentalstatus should be like of the family, it yet advocates that all other relationships familialones. A society that aims to function in the Confuciansense as a large family is unworkablebecause it wants to maintain,at the same time, both a demarcationbetween family and nonfamilyand the extension of family to nonfamily.Thus, a more general problem with Confucian philosophy is that while Confucius wants to retain the idea of existential human equality and similarity-in-kind, yet believes in he social differentiation. Cua expresses the situationthus: "The problemof jen-realization is thus a problem of equalizing the status of humanity without obliteratingexisting social distinctions."36 Confucius did not deal satisfactorily with this problem. The last-mentionedproblem is the more apparentwhen one notes that,within Confucianthinking,it seems that immoralmeans arejustified in order to protect members of the family. In discussing the case of that "the fatherconsheep-stealingas an example, Confuciusremarked ceals the misconductof the son and the son conceals the misconductof the father.This is uprightness" (Analects13:18.2). It emerges from this that the criminalityof stealing is not at issue, or is, at least, of passage lesser importancethan one's duty and obligationto the family. As Confucius notes, a son who sees his parentsdoing wrong should only gently remonstrateand remain reverent (Analects 4:18); the son mentioned in 13:18, who was otherwise "upright,"inappropriately bore witness his father,thus inverting orderof obligationby placing moral the against principleover obligation. It might seem that the Confucian system of family relationships allows for a parentalauthoritarianism could easily hinderor stiflethe that of the child as a responsible acting and thinking being, development especially if compromises of moral values are required.The example quoted above of concealing wrongdoings,if extended to the sphere of the largercommunitysetting, could lead easily to an unprincipled,subjectively constructed, chaotic community-if that could be termed a and communityat all-infused with authoritarianism subjection. Admittedly, Confucian thought as expressed in the Analects is idealisticin assumingthat parentsand rulers(andother people accorded L. positions of responsibility)are moral. However, a weaker, and more Karyn Lai 265 of and plausible,interpretation Confuciantheoryis that it is prescriptivist, that the point Confuciusis actually makingis that it is especially important that people with increasedresponsibilities should be moral. Understood thus, the theory is extremely relevant in that it highlights the enormous amount of social and moral responsibility that is and should be borne by, for instance,educators,predominantly the upbringing in of the young, but not necessarilyrestricted that domain. to The idea that particularduties and responsibilitiesare necessary behavioralcorollariesof particularroles has central emphasis in Confucian thought, and is one area in which the Confucianconception of world. Indeed, moralityhas valuable suggestionsfor our contemporary Confucian,this strainof thought is not uniquely so. though particularly For instance, A. I. Melden says, in Rightsand Right Conduct,that the term 'father',for example, has a moral component such that the mere biological connection whereby one person fertilizes the ovum from which anotherdevelops does not consequentlymean thatthe formeris a fatherto the latter.37 More is required the concept of a father,Melden for since it makessense to say such thingsas "He was like a fatherto argues, me." A paradigmcase of a father,therefore,is "a male parentwho plays his social and moral role with respect to his offspringin the circumstances of family life."38 Such analysis is particularly useful in our contemporary context. We need to reassess notions of care in the light of the high incidences of family breakdownsand of merged families in modern society. In this area, some Confucian ideas could be useful, particularlythe one to remindingthose who play parentalroles of their responsibility set up contexts of care from which value and meaning are derived. Adopting this idea as a primarytenet, one could broaden the minimal coverage of family relationshipsby Confucius in the Analects (dealing only with the father-son relationship)to include other relationships, such as or in mother-daughter grandfather-granddaughter, the light of existing a move, if successful, would relationshipnormsand expectations.Such assure the continuing relevance of Confucian ideals to contemporary situations. In addition,there must be a relativelyfreerand more liberalunderstandingof what li entail. Confuciushimself,as recordedin the Analects, because normsgovdid at times modifyexistingpractices.Furthermore, are largelyculturalanyway, there must be room for erning relationships contextswithin particular communities. adaptingli to the intersubjective normsof the Itwould hardlybe appropriate insistthatthe relationship to ancient Chinese world apply to the here and now, given especially the noticeable lack of discussionof female statusand roles;there is no feminine equivalentof what it means to excel, as in the case of the chun tzu East& West paradigm. Philosophy 266 Li must appeal to communally shared knowledge as well as to established standards and cultural values. Ideally, li would allow for the manifestation of ethical and aesthetic aspects of human interaction such that it could be said that they are "the conductual means used in the present situation and social context to continuously create culture," and which thus serve as a "heuristic vehicle" for the "cultivated expression of human feeling (jen)."39 Understood thus, the Confucian system presents a viable alternative, and a challenge, to systems in which individual autonomy is overvalued. It implicitly asserts that there are serious defects in an ideology that emphasises autonomy at the cost of cooperation. It argues that there is, within any society, a delicate balance between individuality on the one hand and communality on the other; that one of the arduous tasks of politics is to work out some areas that are appropriately self-determined and other areas that require public consensus; and, importantly, that the development of the self can only be meaningfully sought and attained in a context wherein the common good is also emphasized.40 A commendable aspect of Confucian thought in this respect is its emphasis on family values and its attempt to reach back to the family as the source of moral affection and, hence, of ways of caring for others: A father, for example, has the duty to care for his children by providing resourcesforthe satisfaction theirneeds and education;and the son has the of to care for his fatherwhen the latteris sick or disabled because of old duty with an attiage. Moreover,these reciprocalobligationsare to be performed tude of reverenceor respectstyledwith an expressionof affectionate concern. It is this caringattitudethat lies at the heartof extensive moralconcern. Other humanbeings, not in the statusof being one's parentor brother,can also be cared for as one's parentor brother.This is possible because of the analogizing of one's affectionand thought.... We can thus speak of extensive moral concern as essentially a form of analogical projectionof familiarrelationship.41 That Confucius proposed the concept of the individual as a related self rather than define it atomistically does not diminish the moral responsibility of the self. Instead, moral responsibility and, accordingly, human excellence are construed in a different way. Tu Wei-ming conceives of the developing self in an illuminating way; he sees the self as the center of relationships, from which concentric circles of influence emanate, moving gradually from the family, as the innermost ring, to the community, country, and world.42 Seeming practically idealistic at the individual level because of the limits of time and space, and of the nature of human commitment, such a process of gradual inclusion could conceivably be realized in a community of developing selves; this idea of cooperation is deeply ingrained in Confucian thought. L. Karyn Lai 267 Fingarette outlines the contribution of the members of a community to what he feels is a distinctively human community. He writes: To become civilized is to establishrelationships are not merelyphysical, that it of biologicalor instinctive; is to establishhuman relationships, relationships an essentiallysymbolickind.... "Merely feed one's parentswell" ... "even to dogs and horses are fed" (2:7). To be devoted to one's parentsis far more than to keep the parentsalive physically.... To obey the whip is to be not much morethan a domesticanimal;but to be loyal and faithfulto those who rightlygovern, to serve them and thus to serve in the humancommunity,to do this out of one's own heartand nature-this is to be a truecitizen of one's community.43 The human person or self is conceived of in terms of its social interdependency with other human persons. Given that communal life is the only locus of meaning for the human, what is integral is that the self has to be cultivated within the present society-within the life here and now-in conjunction with all others in that society. Life in this community is a dynamic, unceasing one because we need constantly to be working on and developing different relationships with different people, in the quest for the common good. What has been suggested here as an application of a Confucian way of thinking about morality, and about human life in general, is importantly connected with issues of personal identity, self esteem, and human being. Within the context of the Confucian emphasis on communality, the cultivation of a good life-for the individual within the developing society-is a holistic process. Humans are reciprocally connected, and attention must be given to collective welfare. Together with creativity, culture, success in relationships, and social and political order, what we call morality is a means to the affirmation of human life together with other human beings as beings similar-in-kind. The interrelatedness of human beings, their mutual concerns for each other, and their shared interests in their community are forces that could enhance social development and excellence. These characteristics of human life together serve as means toward the good life for the individual in particular, and for the development of and an increase in the quality of the human condition in general. Such an ideal needs to be worked out between people-human beings in their interrelatedness-who share similar cultural presuppositions, evaluative structures, and forms of life, people who are committed to and involved in the development of their community. It is only within such an arena of human interdependency and mutual concern that the Confucian good life ceases to be a mere theoretical ideal and becomes a possible reality. In the words of Tu Wei-ming, "ontologically we are irreducibly human, and existentially we must struggle to remain East& West human."44 Philosophy 268 NOTES 1 - Phraseslike 'Westernphilosophy'or 'Westernphilosophicaltradithis tion,' which I use throughout essay, are but gross generalterms for philosophy done in the so-called Westernworld. Forwant of a better term, however, I use these phrases to denote philosophy primarilyin the Anglo-Americantradition. I also use the terms 'Western'and 'non-Western' philosophyas if there were two internally homogeneous and consistent systems. This is an assumption that is made, however, not as a reflectionof the actualsituation but ratherfor the sake of convenience. Individualsand Role2 - See Henry Rosemont, Jr., "Rights-Bearing MaryBockBearingPersons,"in Rules, Ritualsand Responsibility, over, ed. (LaSalle,Illinois:Open Court,1991). in 3 - HenryRosemont,Jr.,"AgainstRelativism," GeraldJ. Larsonand across Boundaries:New Essaysin EliotDeutsch, eds., Interpreting (Princeton: Princeton University Press, ComparativePhilosophy 1988), pp. 62-64. 4 - These three points are suggested by Joseph Wu, in "The Paradoxical Situationof WesternPhilosophyand the Searchfor Chinese 14: Wisdom," Inquiry 1-18. Wu also notes that his pointsare to be taken as suggestions-as the fishing pole with which we catch the 'fish,"namely, Chinese philosophy. 5 - JamesLegge (in The ConfucianClassics:Shu Ching),comments, in a footnote, that Confucius'constructionof Chinese history in the Shu Ching was not meant, first and foremost, to be an accurate historicalaccount but, rather, suitthe purposesof his philosophy. to Confucius'Shu Ching concludes the story of the Chou dynasty at 770 B.C.-which historicallyended at 249 B.C.-the beginning of a period of weak and ineffective rulers. Legge writes, "Between KingP'ing and KingMu there had reignedseven sovereignsof the house of Chou; and it is remarkable that not a single document of the reign of any of them was incorporatedby Confucius [into the Shu Ching].... Thisfact is sufficientto provethat Confuciusdid not compile the Shoo as a historyof his country,or even intendthat it should afford materials for such a history. His design ... was to fI bringtogethersuch pieces as mightshow the wonderfulvirtueand intelligence of ancient sovereigns and statesmen, who should be made models for those of futureages" (p. 613). 6 - Chad Hansen, Languageand Logic in Ancient China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1983), p. 77. L. Karyn Lai 269 7 - Hall and Ames prefer to translate cheng-ming as "orderingof names" because the term 'rectification', they feel, might connote some sense of makingthings accord with some transcendentrealConfucius(Albany:State University ity;see their ThinkingThrough of New YorkPress,1987), pp. 268-275. 8 - The implicationsof such a theory of names or titles are philosophhowever. One of the ically interesting. They are not unproblematic, most obvious difficultiesis that the theory assumes an objective, ontological basis of the normativemoral importof 'names'. Sectermsand ondly, it suggestsuniversallyheld notionsof relationship theircorresponding behavioralrequirements, thatthese notions and are equally accessible to everyone. 9 - Because Confucius himself never defined the term either metaphysically or ontologically, it has been variously interpretedin Englishas benevolence, love, humanity,humaneness,etc. None of into English,however, is adequateto capturethe these translations of jen as shared humanity. Refer to Wing-tsit Chan, meaning "Chinese and Western Interpretations Jen," Journalof Chinese of 2 (1975): 107-129. Philosophy My conception of the Confucianself is stronglyinfluencedby Tu Wei-ming'scharacterization the individual,in Confucianism, of and of ultimateself-transformation as "a centre of relationships," (or self-cultivation)as a communal act. See his "Ultimate Selftransformation a CommunalAct," Journalof Chinese Philosoas Selfhood as phy 6 (1979): 237-246; also, his ConfucianThought: CreativeTransformation (New York:State Universityof New York Press,1985). 10 -Chu T'ung T'su, in Law and Society in TraditionalChina (The Hague:Mouton& Co., 1965), pp. 226-247, describesthe function of li in their variety of manifestationsand also the many violations of Ii. 11 - Tu Wei-ming, "Lias a Processof Humanization,"PhilosophyEast and West22 (1972): 190. 12 - HerbertFingarette,Confucius:The Secular as Sacred (New York: Harperand Row, 1972). thesis on several counts, too-one of them 13 - I question Fingarette's the seemingly simplisticexamples he uses, and also his acbeing I count of li in termsof "performatives."also feel he has not drawn a tight enough connection between jen and li, which, if done, would providefurther supportfor his thesis. East as Philosophy &West 14 - Henry Skaja, "Li (Ceremonial) a PrimalConcept in Confucian 270 Chinese Philosophy 3; Confucianism and Spiritual-Humanism," Other Schools (Taipei: Chinese Culture University Press, 1984), p. 51. 15 - There are countless examples in the Analects of the spontaneity, imaginativeness,and masteryrequiredin the practise of li: 6:13, 13:5, 2:4, 7:36-37, 8:1, 8:2, 13:26, 15:21. 16 - Legge'stranslation,in ConfucianClassics. 17 - Antonio Cua, "The Concept of ParadigmaticIndividualsin the Ethicsof Confucius,"Inquiry14 (1971): 50-51. Cua in this article of argues for a relatively liberal interpretation Confucian moral with the idea of the chun tzu as a paradigmthat is theory, dealing not bound by strictobedience to principles. 18 - In Tu Wei-ming, "The CreativeTension between Jen and Li," Phi1968): 33. losophy Eastand West 18 (1-2) (January-April 19 - A. S. Cua, "TheConcept of Paradigmatic Indivduals," 44. p. 20 - Tu Wei-ming, "The CreativeTension between Jen and Li,"p. 37, citing Analects 17:13. 21 - HenrySkaja,"Li(Ceremonial) a PrimalConcept,"p. 49. as 22 - Ta Hsueh (Greatlearning),chap. 9, pts. 1-8, in Legge, The Four R; Books (Hong Kong:CultureBook Company). 23 - This formulationhas often been dubbed the "negativeformulation of the golden rule," or the "silver rule." Legge remarks,in his commentaryon the passage, that this is the lesser version of the positive version,which reads "Do to othersas you wish to be done to yourself"(ibid.).RobertAllinsonprovidesan interesting analysis of this so-called "negativeversion,"arguingfor its appropriateness in Confucianphilosophy, in "The ConfucianGolden Rule: Negative Formulation," Journalof Chinese Philosophy12 (1985): 305315. 24 - Translated Wing-tsitChan as "one thread,"in A Source Book in by Chinese Philosophy(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1963), p. 27. 25 - Ibid. 26 - C'hu T'ungTsu, Lawand Society in Traditional China,p. 229. 27 - In PhilosophyEastand West32 (3) (July1982): 237-257. 28 - Hall and Ames, ThinkingThroughConfucius,pp. 232-237. They demonstratethe variabilityof tao according to its differentmanifestationsas recordedin the Analects: L. Karyn Lai 271 (1) different tao of different historical periods (Analects 15:25, 3:16); (2) the tao of differentpeoples: exemplarybeings (Analects14:28, 19:19:12, 11:20), Kings Wen and Wu (Analects 19:22), the AR masses (Analects8:9), family members(Analects1: 14, 6:12, 1:11,4:20); (3) the tao of music (Analects15:42); (4) the tao of archery(Analects3:16); (5) the cosmological tao (Analects5:13). 30 - Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China Press,1985), p. 62. BelknapPressof Harvard (Cambridge: University nd tfW 30 - Tu Wei-ming, ConfucianThought, 58. p. 31 - Li Chi 3: 3b, in Legge, Textsof Confucianism, 3:90. 32 - Tso Chuan53: 6b-7a, in Legge, Chinese Classics5, pt. 2, p. 732. 33 - Ch'u T'ung Tsu, Law and Society in Traditional China, pp. 170172. 34 - BenjaminSchwartz, in The Confucian World Observed, ed. Tu of and Communication, Wei-minget al. (Honolulu:Institute Culture East-West Centre,1992), p. 55. 35 - WilliamTheodorede Bary,The Troublewith Confucianism (Cambridge:Harvard UniversityPress,1991), p. 29 (italicsmine). 36 - AntonioCua, "ConfucianVision and HumanCommunity," Journal of Chinese Philosophy11 (1984): p. 228. 37 - A. I. Melden, Rightsand RightConduct (Oxford:Basil Blackwell, 1959), pp. 36-50. 38 - Ibid. 39 - HenrySkaja,"Li(Ceremonial) a PrimalConcept,"p. 63. as 40 - My remarkshere are inevitablypreliminary because of the essentially empiricaland contextualnatureof such issues. 41 - AntoniaCua, "ConfucianVision and HumanCommunity," 229. p. - Tu Wei-ming, "UltimateSelf-transformation a CommunalAct," 42 as 237-246; also, his ConfucianThought. pp. 43 - HerbertFingarette, Confucius:TheSecularas Sacred,p. 76. 44 - Tu Wei-ming, in "Pain and Sufferingin Confucian Self-Cultivation," PhilosophyEastand West34 (4) (October1984): 17. East Philosophy &West 272