Understanding Confucian Ethics: Reflections on Moral Development more

Understanding Confucian Ethics: Reflections on Moral Development The publication details of this article are: Lai, Karyn (2007) “Understanding Confucian Ethics: Reflections on Moral Development” in Australian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics, vol. 9 no. 2: 2127. ISSN: 1328-4576. (p.21) 1. Introduction The Governor of She in conversation with Confucius said, “In our village there is someone called ‘True Person.’ When his father took a sheep on the sly, he reported him to the authorities.” Confucius replied, “Those who are true in my village conduct themselves differently. A father covers for his son, and a son covers for his father. And being true lies in this.” (Analects 13:18; trans. Ames and Rosemont Jr, 1998: 166-7) The Confucian Analects, a compendium of recollections of conversations with Confucius, abounds with passages like this. The passage is unsettling for a few reasons, even if we acknowledge that it refers to a situation distant in time and place. Confucius, unlike Kant, does not insist on truth-telling in all situations. Commission or omission is not the point; the issue here is concealment of truth. The problem is not primarily due to historical and cultural differences between Confucius and Kant. Confucius catches the governor offguard too. Clearly, abetting and concealment were not universally-accepted practices in China in Confucius’ time. Passages like this in the Analects confound attempts to characterise Confucian ethics. Immanuel Kant was firm in his rejection of Confucius’ philosophy for the following reasons: Philosophy is not to be found in the whole Orient ... Their teacher Confucius teaches in his writings nothing outside a moral doctrine designed for the princes ... and offers examples of former Chinese princes ... But a concept of virtue and morality never entered the heads of the Chinese. In order to arrive at an idea ... of the good [certain] studies would be required, of which [the Chinese] know nothing.1 The Confucian Analects, the conversations of Confucius, are snippets of conversations Confucius is meant to have had with princes, governors and dukes about good government. Their discussions reflect a case-by-case approach to the issues. In Kant’s eyes, these anecdotes are merely descriptive and not properly informed by fundamental principles or norms. He reckons that there is no indication that Confucius was aware of any idea of the good. Kant is correct if we read the Analects literally. Its passages are piecemeal and unorganised; they give the impression that they are primitive because there is a lack of systematic organisation of ideas. They do seem, as Kant notes, to lack a notion of the good, especially if we take that to mean systematic investigation of axiological commitments. Yet, Kant’s worries about Confucian ethics seem to contradict other interpretations of it. Some contemporary philosophers worry about the inflexibility of the epithets in the Analects. According to this view, Confucius’ sayings are (p. 22) prescriptive and not merely one-off decisions. This is especially the case with passages like these: While eating he would not converse, and having retired for the night he would not talk (Analects 10:10; trans Ames and Rosemont Jr., p. 138) In asking after the well-being of a friend in another state, he would bow twice before sending the messenger on his way. (Analects 10:15; trans Ames and Rosemont Jr., p. 138) 2 The intelligent reader must reject these ancient Chinese norms of proper conduct as prescriptive. The problem we have here is different from the one Kant articulates; it is not so much a lack of consistency or principles but rather an overload of prescriptive statements with dated content. Chad Hansen, a philosopher of Chinese thought, argues that Confucian ethics is primarily prescriptive. In his articulation of Chinese philosophical history, Hansen argues that … the focus at the early Confucian baseline is not on metaphysics, but on guidance. [The Confucian] Dao [way] does not communicate scientific truths, but ways to perform. Dao is initially and basically a prescriptive, not a descriptive concept… Its role is communicating and transmitting guidance to society from social leaders through history. (Hansen 1992: 86) How are both these interpretations possible, the first, that Confucian philosophy is merely descriptive, and the second, that it is predominantly prescriptive? Of course, either interpretation is problematic for those wanting to defend the contemporary significance of the Analects. I suggest that the disparate readings are due largely to the composite nature of the text—and Kant was wrong about this—the Analects was not penned by Confucius himself. It is the collated writings of members of the Confucian school based on their recollections of Confucius’ conversations. There were also later interpolations, perhaps even by those with Daoist philosophical commitments. Therefore, the text is one that lends itself very much to interpretation. My argument in this paper centres on how we may read (and understand) the Analects. I suggest that the Analects should be read as a manual of moral decision-making, a log, as it were, of Confucius’ conversations with others. This means that readers of the text will need to extract from its passages possible reasons for Confucius’ decisions. In addition, comparing Confucius’ responses in the different passages will also provide the reader with a sense of morally weighty criteria in his thinking. According to this proposal, the picture of ethics in the Analects is a dynamic and progressive one because it focuses on the skills required for moral deliberation rather than prescriptive behavioural norms. This 3 is a very different interpretation from those that see the approach of Confucian as one that stultifies moral development or is chaotic and situationally-driven. 2. Confucian Moral Thinking A primary ethical concept in Confucianism is li, broadly translated as appropriate behavioural norms. The concept refers to a set of normative practices in Chinese society that were a central part of social interactions such as bowing to one’s superior, adhering to the requirements of the three-year mourning period for one’s (p. 23) parents’ and, more broadly, gestures that were appropriate to one’s social and kinship status. The concept presents much difficulty for modern interpreters of Confucianism because there is a sense of a traditional, backward pull in their dictates. The previous quotations from Book 10 of the Analects demonstrate this point. Analects 12:1 also presents a prescriptive and inflexible approach to li: ...The Master replied, “Do not look at anything that violates the observance of ritual propriety [li]; do not listen to anything that violates the observance of ritual propriety; do not speak about anything that violates the observance of ritual propriety; do not do anything that violates the observance of ritual propriety.” “Though I am not clever,” said Yan Hui, “allow me to act on what you have said.” (trans. Ames and Rosemont Jr, 1998: 152) Confucius’ instructions to his disciple Yan Hui are clear: he is not to violate li in his commitment, thought, speech and action. Yan Hui’s reply is an interesting one; it notes that one does not need to be mentally agile or morally reflective to put these prescriptions into practice.2 The most common approach in dealing with the problem of the inflexibility of li involves an appeal to other Confucian concepts such as ren (compassion or sympathy) as the fundamental moral concept in Confucianism upon which li, the corresponding 4 behavioural manifestations of moral emotions, are grounded.3 According to this view, li are derivative, not basic, and may be modified when necessary; Analects 9:3 supports this interpretation: The Master said, “The use of a hemp cap is prescribed in the observance of ritual propriety (li 禮). Nowadays, that a silk cap is used instead is a matter of frugality. I would follow accepted practice on this. A subject kowtowing on entering the hall is prescribed in the observance of ritual propriety (li 禮). Nowadays that one kowtows only after ascending the hall is a matter of hubris. Although it goes contrary to accepted practice, I still kowtow on entering the hall.” (trans. Ames and Rosemont Jr, 1998: 126). Here we are presented with two cases, one in which Confucius decides to modify existing li and another in which he maintains the status quo. Reasons are provided for the different decisions in each case. In other words, li are not always overriding. Contextual, relational, social—and in this case economic—factors help to determine the right thing to do. In addition, li have different functions that correspond to different moral developmental stages in a person’s life. The functions of li range from a primarily normative one in the case of the person in the early developmental stages to an ethicoaesthetic one that enhances the expression of the mature moral agent. In the following section, I discuss how the Confucian view of moral decision-making is integrated with its theory of moral development. 3. The Cultivation of Character in Confucianism The Confucian approach to morality is underscored by its emphasis on the cultivation of character (xiushen 修身). There are many applications of this theme within Confucian intellectual history, including in discussions of politics, ethics, spiritual transcendence and physical and mental health. For instance, Confucian political philosophy— 5 particularly in the thought of Mencius (c.371-289 BCE), a key thinker in the tradition— holds that an ethically cultivated leader is the best solution to socio(p. 24) political reform; the leader will initiate a trickle-down effect, positively influencing ethical cultivation in the common people. Confucian moral development involves the cultivation of a deep commitment to human welfare that is refined by exposure to and reflection on situations in ordinary life. Moral development of a person is measured in terms of the person’s capacities for moral deliberation. Different expectations and requirements will apply at different levels of moral development. For example, in Analects 11:22, Confucius explicitly addresses his reasons for giving different responses to different enquirers: Zilu inquired, “On learning something, should one act upon it?” The Master said, “While your father and elder brothers are still alive, how could you, on learning something, act upon it?” Then Ranyou asked the same question. The Master replied, “On learning something, act upon it.” Gongxi Hua said, “When Zilu asked the question, you observed that his father and elder brothers are still alive [and must first be consulted], but when Ranyou asked the same question, you told him to act on what he learns. I am confused—could you explain this to me?” The Master replied, “Ranyou is diffident, and so I urged him on. But Zilu has the energy of two, and so I sought to rein him in.” (trans. Ames and Rosemont Jr, 1998: 146-7) Confucius’ advice to these two men is prescriptive. Yet, that there are different prescriptions for each is interesting. There are at least two ways in which we may understand this passage. The first relates to issues of universality and consistency and Confucius’ response suggests it is unwise to take these as fundamental criteria of moral reasoning. The second is the more specific issue relating to his assessment of the different characters of Zilu and Ranyou. Confucius’ reasons must be understood within a conceptual framework that recognises that individuals are capable of moral reasoning to 6 different degrees. It follows that what is usually required of individuals should correspond to their capabilities in moral decision-making. There is another important feature of Confucian self cultivation: the commitment both to practice and reflection is an important tenet of Confucian moral philosophy. The cultivation process involves the individual’s experience of decision-making in different circumstances as well as his study of decisions that have been made by others (Analects 17:9). The Confucius of the Analects is curious about the actions and behaviours of others, and is a keen observer of humanity: The Master said, “In strolling in the company of just two other persons, I am bound to find a teacher. Identifying their strengths, I follow them, and identifying their weaknesses, I reform myself accordingly.” (Analects 7:22; trans. Ames and Rosemont Jr, 1998: 115-6). The Master said: “Watch their actions, observe their motives, examine wherein they dwell content; won’t you know what kind of person they are? Won’t you know what kind of person they are?” (Analects 2:10; trans. Ames and Rosemont Jr, 1998: 78) Both these passages emphasise the importance of observing and understanding behaviours and reasons for action. We are advised not merely to observe or imitate, but also critically to evaluate these behaviours. Confucius’ disciple Zixia emphasises the balance between learning broadly and reflecting on one’s experiences: (p. 25) Zixia said, “Learn broadly yet be focused in your purposes; inquire with urgency yet reflect closely on the question at hand—authoritative conduct (ren 仁) lies simply in this.” (Analects 19:6, trans. Ames and Rosemont Jr, 1998: 2194) 7 The significance both of observing and reflecting is important. What is important in Confucian ethics is not simply to devise a solution for each circumstance. Critical reflection is an important part of self cultivation, and one sharpens one’s capacity for such reflection by applying it to a range of situations. Confucius considers it a pleasure to put into practice what he has learned (Analects 1:1). In his exposure to many different situations the Confucian paradigmatic person cultivates sensitivity to the morally weighty factors that arise in these situations. In brief, the three processes, observation, practice and reflection, are intertwined in Confucian moral cultivation. Philip Ivanhoe discusses the nature of moral cultivation in Confucian thought, emphasising both its practical component and inner moral commitment of the agent. He suggests an insightful analogy between developing one’s moral capacities and juggling: The li are both best means for developing virtue and the best way in which to display the perfected virtue. In this regard, they are not unlike juggling which is both an excellent way to develop dexterity and an excellent way to display it.5 Ivanhoe’s analogy is important because it captures the dual aspect of Confucian moral development. The first is the cultivation of virtuous character and the second its appropriate manifestations in context. Both are fundamental in Confucian ethics and we must resist the tendency to impose an order of priority between ‘inner’ motivational morality and its ‘outer’ manifestation. An agent’s intentions and her efficacy in realising those objectives are equally important. According to this view, moral philosophy is concerned primarily with the moral development of individuals in society.6 It follows that universals—in the forms of normative prescriptions—have a limited place in such a philosophy. 4. Reading and Understanding the Analects According to the argument in this paper, the difficulty in reading the Analects is not that Confucian norms are irrelevant in our contemporary context. Rather, the task is to work 8 out when particular decisions are appropriate, and why. The reader is thrown in the deep end and not provided with much guidance regarding basic moral principles. Of course, this lack of systematic organisation is due largely to the composite nature of the work and its multiple authorships. But what I am suggesting here is a novel way to read the text in order to maximise on the insights a modern audience may draw from it. How might one read the Analects? In piecing together its anecdotes the reader begins to get a sense of why Confucius gave different advice to different people. This is the approach I have attempted to demonstrate in the preceding sections of the paper. The reader of the Analects also begins to understand that concepts—even the fundamental Confucian ideas—are not clearly defined but instead their different applications are discussed. Readers will not find definitions of the sort in the Platonic dialogues. It is interesting to note that Socrates in his dialogue with Euthyphro was demanding exactly that Euthyphro provide a definition of piety and not just cite instances of it: (p. 26) Soc. Remember that I did not ask you to give me two or three examples of piety, but to explain the general idea which makes all pious things to be pious. Do you not recollect that there was one idea which made the impious impious, and the pious pious? (Plato, Euthyphro, trans. Benjamin Jowett, 1988: 14) In the Analects, all of the discussions are instances of this virtue or that concept. The reader is required to extract the general sense of the concept through understanding its instantiations—in a way exactly opposite to what Socrates demands of Euthyphro. The Analects offers its readers an opportunity to develop their capacity for moral judgment through reflecting on reasons for action, comparing different characters, and evaluating morally significant factors. It is not a prescriptive text that tells its readers what to do in particular situations. It invites them critically to engage with and reflect on the discussions in the passages. There are also in the text examples of those who are lazy or morally immature (Analects 5:9) and many others whose actions are to be deplored. The Analects emphasises learning broadly on more than one occasion (see 6:27; 17:9) because 9 exposure to a broad range of different situations is essential in cultivating one’s awareness and sensitivity to those considerations that are morally weighty.7 The translation of Analects 17:9 by Ames and Rosemont Jr. communicates this vision of moral cultivation: The Master said, “My young friends, why don’t any of you study the Songs? Reciting the Songs can arouse your sensibilities, strengthen your powers of observation, enhance your ability to get on with others, and sharpen your critical skills...” (at p. 206) I must emphasise that the approach to reading the Analects that I have defended is a creative one. It has many embedded assumptions that are historically out of place, including assumptions about individual initiative and the moral development of the person. However, my task here is to offer a method of reading the Analects that makes it come alive for modern readers. Furthermore, there are important insights we can draw from Confucian moral philosophy when we understand the text this way. Its practicecentred focus draws attention to features of life that are morally relevant, including a self constituted in part by tradition, relationships and social context. Such features tend to be reduced or ignored, or even denied, in ethical approaches that favour universalisability and impartiality. The picture of morality based on a constituted self is ultimately more realistic because it does not believe that a fully free-willing moral agent is the paradigmatic moral individual. Morality in Confucian philosophy is about the exercise of moral discretion in situations where there are constraints. Reading and understanding the Analects in this way allows the reader to exercise her moral imagination and develop her awareness of the many factors and constraints that come into play in moral situations. Notes References Ames, Roger and Rosemont Jr., Henry (1998) The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation, New York: Ballantine Publishing Group. 10 Ching, Julia (1978) “Chinese Ethics and Kant” Philosophy East and West, Vol. 28, no. 2: 161-172. Hansen, Chad (1992) A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Ivanhoe, Philip (1990) “Thinking and Learning in Early Confucianism” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. 17, no. 4: 473-493. Lai, Karyn (2006) “Li in the Analects: Training in Moral Competence and the Question of Flexibility” in Philosophy East and West, vol. 56, no. 1: 69-83. Lai, (2006) Learning from Chinese Philosophies, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing. Plato, trans. Benjamin Jowett (1988) Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books. Shun, Kwong Loi (1993) “Jen and Li in the Analects” in Philosophy East and West, 1993, vol. 43, no. 3: 457-479. Tu, Wei Ming (1968) “The Creative Tension Between Jen and Li” in Philosophy East and West, 1968, vol. 18: 29-69. 11 1 Helmuth von Glasenapp, Kant und die Religionen des Osten. Beihefte zum Jahrbuch der Albertus- Universitat, Konigsberg/Pr. (Kitzingen-Main: Holzner verlag, 1954), pp. 105-106, translated by Julia Ching and quoted in “Chinese Ethics and Kant”. Ching focuses on fundamental differences in the structures and dynamics of early Chinese philosophy and Kantian philosophy. 2 Those familiar with the Confucian tradition might note that Yan Hui in fact was not lacking in moral or intellectual capacities; Confucius values Yan Hui’s opinion (Analects 2:9) and held him in high regard (Analects 6:5; 6:9). This passage may express Yan Hui’s modesty rather than his actual moral maturity. Nevertheless, it is significant that Yan Hui notes that adherence to normative li does not require critical reflection. 3 Tu (1968) in “The Creative Tension Between Jen and Li” argues that ren functions “... as an inner morality ... not caused by the mechanism of li from outside. It is higher-order concept which gives meaning to li.” (pp. 31-3). According to this view, li are only instrumental, a vehicle for the expression of ren. There are other proposals, including those which assert that li is not the only fundamental moral concept in Confucianism and therefore that its specific applications must be vindicated in the light of other fundamental Confucian concepts. Shun (1993) “Jen and Li in the Analects” argues that ren and li are interdependent basic concepts in Confucianism. 4 5 6 See also Analects 2:15. Ivanhoe (1990), footnote 21, at p. 490. I have argued elsewhere that Confucian ethics should be understood as a skills-based ethic (Lai (2006) Learning from Chinese Philosophies, Chapter 5 “Confucianism as a Skills-Based Ethic,” pp. 109-124). There, I argue that Confucian self cultivation has a skills-based focus and is a process during which one learns to balance competing demands and negotiate difficult relationships. 7 If we accept this thesis, there is little justification for the view that the Analects should be read primarily as a text of normative ethics. Furthermore, it seems curious that a text that presents an essentially empirically-based approach to ethics should also at the same time emphasise normative ethics; the two approaches cannot be fundamental within one system.